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Abstract
The need for advanced cyber security measures and strategies is attributed to modern
sophistications of cyber-attacks and intense media attention when attacks and breaches
occur. In May 2014, a congressional report suggested that Americans used
approximately 500 million Internet-capable devices at home, including, but not limited to
Smartphones, tablets, and other Internet-connected devices, which run various unimpeded
applications. Owing to this high level of connectivity, our home environment is not
immune to the cyber-attack paradigm; rather, the home has evolved to become one of the
most influenced markets where the Internet of Things has had extensive surfaces, vectors
for attacks, and unanswered security concerns. Thus, the aim of the present research was
to investigate behavioral heuristics of the Internet of Things by adopting an exploratory
multiple case study approach. A controlled Internet of Things ecosystem was constructed
consisting of real-life data observed during a typical life cycle of initial configuration and
average use. The information obtained during the course of this study involved the
systematic acquisition and analysis of Smart Home ecosystem link-layer protocol data
units (PDUs). The methodology employed during this study involved a recursive
multiple case study evaluation of the Smart Home ecosystem data-link layer PDUs and
aligned the case studies to the existing Intrusion Kill Chain design model. The proposed
solution emerging from the case studies builds the appropriate data collection template
while concurrently developing a Security as a Service (SECaaS) capability to evaluate
collected results.
Keywords: Internet of Things (IoT) Security, Internet of Everything (IoE), Smart
Home Security, Smart Home Security Solutions.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
As our world becomes increasingly interconnected, cyber security is expected to
increase in prominence. High prevalence of Internet-connected devices has rendered
many individuals vulnerable to breaches due to cyber-attacks. The latest generation of
electronic devices labeled   

             

Internet and this drive is promoted as a means of making life easier and more efficient for
the device     

            -off, as it

exposes us to significant risks because personal data can be stolen or misappropriated,
causing a multitude of problems for the device owner. In particular, the rapid
technological advances have not been matched with increased cyber security for the
Internet of Things (IoT) devices. The IoT security lag creates an imbalance between
technology and available security to satisfy the demands of the current technology.
Researchers in the field of IoT note that the current security applications do not consider
the advancement of technology or new technology use (Demblewski, 2015). Therefore,
as the overall security framework lacks the capability to meet the current demand,
millions of private and public individuals, as well as companies, are at risk of invasion or
data theft. Such breaches can have adverse financial, economic, and physical
consequences. The goal of security frameworks is to identify future security concerns as
a means of ensuring that devices are consistently and adequately protected (Demblewski,
2015). In light of the rapidly increasing scope and severity of security threats, future
1

security structures and IoT security solutions need to be developed dynamically, so that
they can evolve to respond to future changes and demands.
Background
Due to the misalignment between rapid technological advances and available
security measures, cyberspace has gained national focus and has become increasingly
insecure over the past twenty-five years (Mandt, 2015). The chronic lack of security is
attributed to the incongruence with which technological advancement are implemented
into the devices and services and the corresponding security measures, allowing greater
opportunities for attackers to take advantage of the resulting vulnerabilities. Thus,
despite the advancements in both technology and security, cybercriminals are still able to
manipulate the available technology to meet their needs, resulting in a stalemate between
  

  



           

breached, allowing attackers to take control of lateral and more secure systems.
Attackers are also able to steal/misappropriate data, and cause a variety of damages, not
only to the technology and all related components, but to the owner as well, through libel,
slander, threats, loss of data, theft, and other risks. In order to mitigate these risks,
differing defensive strategies are being developed by cyberspace professionals. These
defensive measures are designed to meet the increases in technological vulnerabilities
and influence the overall security posture of the emergent technologies. The resulting
efforts will make it harder for attackers to access the information within the technology as
well as control the technology remotely through unauthorized access. In these initiatives,
particular emphasis has been given to cyber-threat intelligence. This information
suggests that knowledge must holistically align with the relevant technology's
2

functionality and its vulnerabilities, as well as viable means of protection. However,
efforts made in this domain have yet to yield desirable outcomes, due to the rapid pace of
technological advancement (Mandt, 2015). As a result, until technology and security
advancements fully align, it is impossible to obtain accurate intelligence based on which
vulnerabilities can be detected and evaluated.
Smart technology is also immature, as the current trends in smart technology
encompass rapid technological advances. Thus, although smart technology is used by
many individuals, it has not yet become conventional and lacks prominent market
presence. However, smart technology use is expected to expand tremendously until 2020
(R. Brown, 2015). Although security measures are currently in place, they are not
necessarily strong enough to withstand the constant onslaught of the data transmittal that
occurs, with exponentially growing nodes always connecting to the Internet (R. Brown,
2015). This increased throughput and growing population of nodes suggest that greater
opportunities will exponentially emerge with problems concerning the data organic to
smart technology. For example, data can be obtained intentionally or unintentionally
without authorization. Smart technological data can serve a more nefarious purpose,
subsequently causing a myriad of problems for the data holder. Therefore, it is necessary
to ensure that consumers are aware of smart technology vulnerabilities and threats. Being
conscious of and resolving the vulnerabilities and threats related to smart technology can
be beneficial in the effort to eliminate cyber-crime and reduce the number of cyberattacks on data comprehensively.

3

Problem Opportunity Statement
Innovative trends in technology are common occurrence and help advance its
usage. For example, cell phones that were once large and clunky have been gradually
redesigned as their usage became more prevalent, and are now small and compact. The
evolution of telephones has also seen similar trends. As communications evolved beyond
wired applications, cordless devices with much longer ranges became available, and
many individuals now use the Internet rather than conventional telephone systems.
Similarly, vehicles used to be powered by combustion engine and required frequent
refueling at petrol stations. Now, it is possible to purchase vehicles that utilize a hybrid
of electricity and fuel, allowing the driver to travel further before having to refuel or
recharge. On a grander scale, not so long ago, it was impossible to fly across the country;
yet, NASA has put a spaceship on the Moon. Thus, limitations are being overcome with
advances in science and technology, which are driven by the desire to meet new needs
and new demands. In the early 2000s, the Windows phone was in trend, to be replaced
by Android, eventually leading to the iPhone. In computers, it was once inconceivable
that virtually everyone in the developed world would have a personal computer (PC), yet
now most of us have a laptop, as well as a notebook, a netbook, and/or tablets. As this
trend shows, devices are getting smaller, faster, and smarter. Most devices can now
connect to the Internet without the use of a PC. Amidst all these advancements, security
requirements have also increased. However, security improvements have not changed at
an equally rapid pace to meet the needs of the technology users. Therefore, smart
technology presents increased opportunities for cyber-attacks due to the shortcomings of
the currently available security measures. In line with the above, the problem statement
4

for this study is that consumers are not necessarily aware of vulnerabilities associated
with IoT devices despite regularly purchasing smart technology (King, 2015).
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this qualitative exploratory research was to investigate Smart
Home technological vulnerabilities within a real life context of the IoT typical usage
applications and to characterize this average usage in relation to acceptable and nefarious
data behaviors. The contrasted data behavior was subsequently used to illuminate
anomalous data link traffic and payloads. Finally, data was collected through measuring
Smart Home technology communications in a controlled environment. Current data
shows that Smart Home technology owners are not aware of the dangers they face, nor
are they cognizant of the extent to which the risks they face stem from ubiquitous
technological vulnerabilities (Lemos, 2015). The information obtained in this study
involves the systematic acquisition and analysis of Smart Home ecosystem link-layer
protocol data units (PDUs).
Research Questions
The present investigation focused on broadening consumer awareness of the
security threats and privacy concerns associated with conventional Smart Home webenabled devices. Thus, as a part of this study, information pertaining to the background
of security threats concerning Smart Home technology was obtained through extensive
literature review. Therefore, the research questions (RQs) were developed in the context
of propositions and were aligned to explore Smart Home technology vulnerabilities and
threats. Based on the background information, the following research questions were
developed:
5

RQ1. How secure are Smart Home technology IoT systems, independently?
RQ2. What behavioral data exchange or aggregate device communication occurs
between Smart Home objects that effect fundamental security levels?
RQ3. What are the emergent security issues related to Smart Home object
behavior that affects personal safety relating to cyber security, resilience to cyber threats,
and personally identifiable information from the collection of object usage data?
Propositions
Based on the background information, problem opportunity statement, purpose
statement, and research questions, the following propositions can help direct the
qualitative focus of the research:
1.

It is proposed that Smart Home technology IoT systems are secure only

insofar as their owners enable security for these devices, as to be explored given the
results of RQ1.
2.

It is proposed that Smart Home ecosystem behavioral data exchanges and

aggregate communications result in security vulnerabilities, as to be explored given the
results of RQ2.
3.

It is proposed that confidential information, personally identifiable

information, and personal safety are inadequately protected in Smart Home ecosystems,
as to be explored given the results of RQ3.
Independent IoT Security. RQ1 is formulated to focus on device-specific Smart
Home technology IoT systems for discovering separate areas of vulnerabilities.
Independent vulnerabilities stem from isolated devices that are subject to improper
configurations, targeted attacks, and unintentional misnomers. Activities of this nature
6

are often mitigated to an acceptable level through vendor specific remedies though
untimely mitigations may pose a residual vulnerability.
Behavioral Heuristics of Aggregated Devices. RQ2 is formulated to focus on
inter-device communications that pose vulnerabilities due to a lack of vendor standards.
The time associated with remedies which combat aggregate device vulnerabilities is
subject to the interests of proprietary market leaders. To foundationally understand
sound levels of communication security, vendors typically defer to international security
standards to which products must adhere. In this research area, it is established that
residual vulnerabilities persist due to a lack of standards and/or noncompliance.
Security of the IoT. RQ3 is formulated to distinguish among three distinct
security categories

personal safety, personal cyber security, and personally identifiable

information. All three relate to the vulnerabilities at the intersection of the physical
domain, the Internet domain, and the Smart Home technology domain (see Figure 1).
Within each independent domain, the intersection depicts the device categories that
emerge as capabilities shared between the adjacent domains. For example, the singlestate devices reside at the intersection of the physical and the Smart Home technology
domains, as these require physical proximity to Smart Home technology device to
influence personal safety. At the intersection between the physical and the Internet
domains reside control platforms, which require external mitigations to address personal
cyber security concerns. Finally, multi-state devices with sensory data reside at the
intersection of the Smart Home technology and the Internet domains, given that these
require advanced external and internal mitigations to address personal cyber security, and

7

personally identifiable information security concerns. Hence, the IoT capabilities emerge
at the intersection of all three domains.
Conceptual Framework
Within organizations, IoT use is expected to increase. Researchers and
practitioners perceive IoT as an integrated global network with the constant transmission
of information of connection-oriented devices (Boos, Guenter, Grote, & Kinder, 2013;
Sundmaeker, Guillemin, Friess, & Woelfflé, 2010). Therefore, the use of Smart Home
technology is based on the constant transmittal of data via an integrated global
ecosystem. At the same time, threats and vulnerabilities implicit in Smart Home
technologies can be examined through human control theories and field theories, which
pertain to external and internal threats, respectively (Kalika, Pallud, & Elie-Dit-Cosaque,
2011). The conceptual framework adopted in the present study derives from theoretical
perspectives. The major components of this study are physical, the Internet, and Smart
Home technology that, while distinct, also overlap. For example, the physical domain
overlaps with the Internet due to control platforms, as well as with Smart Home
technology due to single-state devices. At the same time, the Internet overlaps with
Smart Home technology due to multi-state devices with sensory data. Finally, physical,
the Internet, and Smart Home technology domains overlap due to IoT, as shown in Figure
1.

8

Table 1

  

al., 2011)

              (Hutchins et

Phase

Description

Case Study (CS)
CS 1

Weaponization

Research, identification, and selection of targets, often
represented as crawling Internet websites such as conference
proceedings and mailing lists for email addresses, social
relationships, or information on specific technologies.
Coupling a remote access trojan with an exploit into a
deliverable payload, typically using an automated tool
(weaponizer). Increasingly, client application data files such as
Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) or Microsoft Office
documents serve as the weaponized deliverable.

Delivery

Transmission of the weapon to the targeted environment.

CS 2

Exploitation

CS 2

Command &
Control

After the weapon is delivered to victim host, exploitation triggers
intruders' code
Installation of a remote access trojan or backdoor on the victim
system allows the adversary to maintain persistence inside the
environment.
Typically, compromised hosts must beacon outbound to an
Internet controller server to establish a C2 channel.

Actions on
Objectives

Intruders take actions to achieve their original objectives and can
pinpoint and access critical data

CS 3

Reconnaissance

Installation

CS 1

CS 2

CS 3

Source: Hutchins et al. (2011)
In the context of this study, the Intrusion Kill Chain personifies the anatomy of a cyber
intrusion. As discussed in Chapter 3, the case studies conducted as a part of this
investigation sought to discover progressively phased indicators of a cyber intrusion.
Reconnaissance phase activities are characterized as actor-driven efforts aimed at
obtaining generalized information about a potential victim (Hutchins et al., 2011).
Information gathering in the reconnaissance phase helps the attacker draw conclusions
about the potential victim. Conclusions are drawn to assist in determining whether the
victim's technology in use is susceptible to specific attack vectors. The weaponization
phase occurs when the attacker customizes attack vectors to achieve desired results.
Often, the customization includes the creation of highly specific functions (e.g., through
10

ruby or python) that force the victim's device to respond in a predetermined sequence. In
the delivery phase, the infrastructure is physically connecting the attacker (or attacker's
architecture) to the victim (or victim's architecture) and transmits the weaponized
function. In this context, exploitation is defined as the successful manipulation of a
particular vulnerability using the weaponized function. In the installation phase that
follows, the weaponized function calls secondary functions to implant instructions on the
victim's device(s). In such an event, infrastructure is established to create communication
between the attacker and the victim, which can be linear or obfuscated (the command and
control phase). The final phase pertains to the actions the attacker desires to perform on
the victim's device(s). Depending on the attacker skill level, the actions that are executed
in the objective phase may include sanitation of evidence that any intrusion occurred or
may involve sustainment of access through custom encryption tactics.
Assumptions/Biases
As any study of this nature, this research is subject to some assumptions and
biases. Specifically, it is assumed that the researcher will remain objective when
analyzing subjective data and will assign the same value to all data. The equal data value
consideration is assumed because of the need for consistency in analysis. It is further
assumed that the researcher will apply consistent methodology when collecting and
analyzing the data. This assumption is a necessary prerequisite for all ubiquitous devices.
It is also assumed that the use of Smart Home technology will become more prevalent in
the future, making security for smart technology even more relevant. The assumption of
continued usage of Smart Home technology and consistent market growth is pertinent to
the rate of technology advancement and expectations for security.
11

Significance of the Study
The study is significant to both research and practice, as the results yielded reveal
tertiary behavioral device susceptibility to vulnerabilities. For example, the study
findings assess and reveal the current level of smart technology vulnerabilities.
Consumers and manufacturers can incorporate the conclusions from this study to help
build awareness and smart technology usage expectations. Moreover, those involved in
developing security measures can respond to the current smart technology vulnerabilities

   

      

the capabilities

offered to users and adapting the security requirements to emergent smart technology can
mitigate cyber-attacks while remaining consistent for consumer use.
Delimitations
In order to allow the study findings to be interpreted in the correct context, it is
essential to state its delimitations explicitly. In the present work, the researcher has
elected to focus primarily on smart technology. Restricting the study scope to Smart
Home technology allowed addressing one of the most rapidly growing sectors of the
technology industry and purchasing trends among technology consumers today. In
particular, the researcher has elected to include primarily smart technology that currently
connects to the Internet. This narrow focus in terms of the scope and types of technology
considered in this study allows the investigation to concentrate on the knowledge of the
existence of vulnerabilities relating to smart technology, thus responding to the current
demands and trends within the industry. Finally, this knowledge is assessed in relation to
the degree of vulnerabilities inherent to smart technology systems.
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Limitations
Owing to the narrow scope of the present study, its findings cannot be generalized
beyond the types of technologies examined in this work. Thus, the results reported in this
thesis will primarily be of value to those that own smart technology. In addition, the
researcher must remain aware that the research conducted does not apply to all smart
technology users. For instance, some individuals may be highly adept and
knowledgeable about their technology, the risks associated, and the vulnerabilities. On
the other hand, some smart technology owners may have little to no awareness of risks
and/or vulnerabilities. Consumer knowledge level regarding the improvement of
associated smart technology security levels can affect the applicable design of related
Smart Home ecosystems. However, without a nominal Smart Home ecosystem
configuration, it is impossible to gain an accurate and generalizable view of the degree of
Smart Home technology vulnerabilities. Thus, this variance of knowledge levels limits
the ability of this study to generalize to Smart Home ecosystems beyond a nominal
security configuration.
Definition of Terms
The following terms are frequently used in the thesis and are thus defined in the
context of the present study:
Smart Home ecosystem. The term Smart Home pertains to a home predominately
controlled by technology and embedded sensors. These sensors can be pre-programmed
to ensure that certain activities within the home occur at a certain time (such as turning
on/off an irrigation system, activating external lighting, or adjusting the thermostat).

13

Different devices typically connect the Smart Home to the Internet (Gartner & Gartner,
2015).
IoT (Internet of Things). The IoT refers to the ubiquitous array of web-enabled
devices that create parallel connection states (Griffin, 2014b). IoT generally provides web
access to physical devices that would not typically connect to a logical network.
IoE (Internet of Everything). Similar to the IoT, the IoE refers to the connection
of people, things, data, and processes (Cisco_INC., 2016). The IoE incorporates a broader
concept of ubiquitous connectivity from the perspective of existing technology. IoE
generally provides enhanced web access and capability to physical devices that would
typically connect to a logical network.
Cyber attack/cyber intrusion. The essence of a cyber attack/cyber intrusion is
based on a purposeful act of aggression whereby an entity develops a payload to breach a
logical or trusted boundary. Passing this threshold enables an aggressor to establish a
presence in a trusted environment, allowing various actions to be performed in order to
achieve a specific objective (Hutchins et al., 2011).
Vulnerability. In the science of computer security, a vulnerability is indicative of
a flaw that allows an attacker to reduce a system's general state of security (J. Hughes &
Cybenko, 2014).
Threat. Threats represent the intersection of three elements: a
 

 

   

     





 

      

capability and intent to exploit such flaw (J. Hughes & Cybenko, 2014).
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General Overview of the Research Design
As a part of the present study, a vulnerability test was performed, which
incorporated the theoretical basis of how disparate manufactured systems interconnect.
The vulnerability test assisted in meeting the research objectives. In particular, the
vulnerability tests pertained to various wireless sensor network (WSN) products,
ubiquitous networks, and pervasive computing in the categories of appliances,
Smartphones, multimedia systems, lighting, heating, and home alarm systems, as these
elements are most pertinent in the systems considered within the Smart Home domain.
Devices operating within the Smart Home domain either consume user data or traverse
the construct of availability-based systems. The case studies comprising this research
were conducted in a controlled environment. The first case study focused on counterreconnaissance efforts to enhance discovery of possible cyber intrusions relevant to an
IoT network, as well as determine the propensity of cyber intrusions to implant into the
IoT network. The reconnaissance and discovery efforts helped determine how secure
Smart Home technology IoT systems are independent of other connected devices. The
second case study focused on the effectiveness of a proposed Debian 7 based (open
source Intrusion Detection Software (IDS)) solution. Finally, the aim of the third case
study was to explore the IoT object behavior as it applies to the handling of cyber
security and safety, resilience to cyber-threats, and personally identifiable information.
Organization of the Dissertation
The present chapter, Chapter 1, served as the introduction to the study. As was
stated earlier, the aim of the present investigation was to determine cyber security in the
IoT context and evaluate the current use of Smart Home technology. Since Smart Home
15

technology is becoming more prevalent, it is necessary to dedicate greater efforts into
maintaining and/or improving cyber security. As a part of this introductory chapter, the
research questions, propositions, limitations, assumptions, and bias were stated, before
summarizing information pertinent to the remainder of the thesis. Chapter 2 provides the
literature review, focusing on extant studies discussing cyber-attacks, IoT and IoE threats,
and vulnerabilities. The methodology utilized for the study is discussed in Chapter 3,
elaborating on the concepts behind the study design, thus allowing other researchers to
replicate the current research in the future. Chapter 4 provides the study results, which
are discussed in relation to the pertinent literature. The final chapter, Chapter 5, provides
the conclusion to the study, while also offering recommendations for future activities.
Summary of Chapter 1
The aim of this chapter was to provide a brief overview of the cyber security
background, including vulnerabilities, especially in relation to Smart Home technology.
As a part of Chapter 1, security threats and privacy concerns inherent in common Smart
Home web-enabled devices used by the consumer were also highlighted. The IoT
security lag creates an imbalance between technology and the ability of currently
available security to satisfy the demands of current technology. This incongruence leaves
millions of private and public individuals and companies at risk of invasion or data theft.
Yet, available evidence shows that most consumers are unaware of these vulnerabilities.
Independent vulnerabilities stem from isolated devices that are subjected to improper
configurations, targeted attacks, and unintentional misnomers often mitigated to an
acceptable level through vendor specific remedies. However, untimely mitigations may
pose a residual vulnerability due to lack of vendor standards or noncompliance. These
16

issues were the basis for forming the research questions and propositions, addressed in
the remainder of this thesis.
The IoT capabilities emerge from the vulnerabilities situated at the intersection of
the physical domain, the Internet domain, and the Smart Home technology domain, with
some inherent vulnerabilities pertinent to all three domains. In this chapter, evidence was
provided, confirming that Smart Home technology vulnerabilities exist. Thus, Smart
Home technology is not inherently prepared for potential cyber-attacks, and the common
Smart Home technology system is only moderately secure.
As a part of Chapter 1, study limitations, assumptions, and biases were outlined,
as these allow interpretation of the findings reported later in this thesis. The chapter's
primary importance stems from the delineation of the basic framework for the study, as
well as explicating its contribution to the growing field of research.
Chapter 2 is dedicated to the review of pertinent literature, focusing on the
sources where personal cyber security in the context of the Internet of Everything (IoE)
and the Internet of Things (IoT) are discussed. The aim of the literature review is to
identify the gaps in the current knowledge of cyber security, thus confirming the need for
the present study, as well as validating further requirements to investigate and assess the
possibility of cyber-crimes in the domain of Smart Home technology. The discussions
presented in Chapter 2 also highlight the distinction between threats and vulnerabilities,
while providing the definition of the nature of both internal and external threats. The
CIA Triad is mentioned to establish the foundational work accomplished, which balances
efforts for network security. The IoE and the IoT are studied to understand the evolution
of ubiquitous computing systems as they relate to the Smart Home ecosystem. Cyber17

crime protection and cyber-crime laws are considered to validate modern challenges as
they relate to Smart Home technology vulnerabilities, while also being pertinent to
resolving Smart Home technology vulnerabilities. Finally, Chapter 2 closes with a
general overview of the case study methodology and a summary of the literature review
findings.
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CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
Introduction
The purpose of the literature review presented, is to provide information regarding
cyber security, the IoT, and Smart Homes. The chapter begins with a discussion of the
need for cyber security and provides insight regarding the vulnerabilities within the
IoT/the IoE and associated cyber-crimes, including internal and external threats. The
chapter also includes a discussion relating to the challenges when cyber-crime warrants
further investigations and legal assessments. The literature reviewed in the sections that
follow explore the sources that build fundamental cyber security focus, such as the CIA
Triad, cyber-crime protection mechanisms, and cyber-crime laws. The different types of
Smart Home technology are discussed as well, along with their default vulnerabilities and
strategies that can be adopted to resolve them. The chapter closes with a discussion of
the chosen research strategy and a summary of the key points.
The Need for Cyber Security
Due to rapid advancements in technology, the need for advanced cyber security
has increased dramatically over the last few years, owing to the widespread Internet
broadband availability and decreased computing component cost (Mohn, 2015). In
October 2015, AT&T reported that, in comparison to 2013, 2014 AT&T networks
realized a 62% increase in malicious scanning activity and a 458% increase in
vulnerability scans of IoT devices (Krause, 2015). The need for advanced cyber security
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is partly attributed to the sophistication of cyber-attacks and intense media attention when
attacks and breaches do occur (Dunn Cavelty, 2014). The growing need for advanced
cyber security is also related to increased attacker structure and organization when
executing cyber intrusions. As a result, cyber-attacks are more costly and much more
detrimental to the victims. For example, numerous cyber-attacks have been attempted on
     



tional security, rendering the country vulnerable to domestic and

international terrorist threats (Dunn Cavelty, 2014). Other common targets for cyberattacks include organizations that use, consume, and store sensitive data. Although
databases with this type of information are primarily employed in the governmental
sector, many are also developed and maintained within the private sector (Bamrara,
2015).
According to Joseph Swedish, President, and CEO of Anthem Inc., a large
insurance company, in 2014, a sophisticated cyber-attack on Anthem Blue Cross and
Blue Shield affected the private information of approximately 80 million individuals
(Swedish, 2015). The cyber-attack compromised current and former members, as their
names, birthdays, medical IDs/social security numbers, street addresses, email addresses,
and employment information were unlawfully obtained, along with their detailed income
data (Swedish, 2015). However, the breach was not reported until early February 2015.
According to the reported findings, the cyber-attacks were carried out through stealing
the credentials of Anthem employees, which was obtained through a widespread phishing
fraud (Balbi, 2015). During the conduct of the breach, personal identifying information
was stolen, putting millions at risk of identity theft. Significantly, the Anthem breach
was the largest breach reported to date by a healthcare company (Balbi, 2015).
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Healthcare companies are not the only targets of sophisticated cyber-attacks.
Existing public records proved that cyber-attacks also target large retail companies. For
example, in December 2013, Target proved to be vulnerable to sophisticated exploits
when the retailer was the victim of two separate cyber-attacks (Weiss & Miller, 2015).
The first attack occurred when financial data pertaining to approximately 40 million
credit and debit card account numbers were stolen. Less than a month later, in January
 

                

  

been stolen. The company also estimated that approximately 70 million individuals
could be potential victims (Weiss & Miller, 2015). In October 2015, Target reported that
the two data breaches incurred losses of about $248 billion. It is particularly noteworthy
that the reported costs were not entirely inclusive. A congressional research service
conducted by Weiss and Miller indicated that these costs did not include estimated losses
due to a subsequent decline in consumer confidence regarding the handling of their
personal data, nor do these costs account for any potential malice, such as damages
incurred to consumer credit history (Weiss & Miller, 2015). Finally, the costs related to
the Target data breach excluded penalties and/or fines levied by the government (Weiss
& Miller, 2015). Significantly, this particular breach has been publicized as one of the
largest in the history of the United States. As a result, consumers are increasingly
concerned, given the size of the data breach (Weiss & Miller, 2015).
Other concerns relate to the critical infrastructure of the United States. In 2009,
                
  

    

      

   (R. Hughes, 2010). Furthermore, it is

anticipated that future wars will take place in cyberspace, which has emerged as a new
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battlefield, allowing enemies to attack from any location at any time. Unfortunately,
while cyber warfare is gaining in popularity among those aiming to cause harm, public
awareness of its extent and devastating consequences are limited. According to R.
Hughes (2010), cyber war will be executed through unique cyber-weaponry that will
evolve through generations, as will cyber warfare tactics and applications. The author
also noted that terrorist groups commonly use attack vectors that maximize damage and
avoids directly engaging a formidable adversary.
Cyber-Crime Protection and Laws
Cyber security is not merely a technical issue, but rather involves many diverse
legal aspects and frameworks. Therefore, it is necessary for developed countries to assist
developing countries in the establishment of strong protections related to cyber-crime
(ITU, 2014). At the end of 2006, there were approximately 19 substantive cyber-crime
laws and three procedural cyber-crime laws enacted within the United States (Rees,
2006). However, as of 2013, 28 revisions were recommended for laws governing actions
attributed to cyber-crimes, or those specifically created to address cyber-crimes (Fischer,
2013). Cyber-crime laws are necessary for a variety of reasons, predating the Internet,
and serving many different purposes. However, many laws require revision in order to
respond to the rapidly changing circumstances. In particular, amendments and
modifications are expected to persist in the future in order to accommodate cyber-crime
due to the strong relationship between cyber-crime and social ties. One significant form
of cyber-crime, relating to society, is phishing. For example, many phishers are part of
an organized group, suggesting that this is becoming organized crime. Available
evidence also indicates that organized phisher groups are involved in real-world
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relationships through social networks, rather than being members of Internet forums.
Moreover, they focus on the use of social engineering, in contrast to malware, to acquire
unauthorized information (Leukfeldt, 2014).
Additionally, there is a growing need for cyber security measures. According to a
study conducted by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), information
technology systems and the development of Internet services are directly related to cyber
security (ITU, 2014). Consequently, for enhancements in cyber security to occur, critical
information infrastructures must be protected to increase national security and economic
well-being (ITU, 2014). Moreover, to make the Internet safer, it is necessary to align
new services and capabilities with government policies (ITU, 2014). Owing to the
complexity of cyber-crime, appropriate deterrents are integral to national cyber security
and strategies related to protecting the critical information structure. Based on these
needs, it is conceivable that cyber security laws can continue to advance proportionally
with technology and vulnerabilities (ITU, 2014).
Challenges to Investigating and Assessing Cyber-Crime
The seriousness of cyber-crimes and cyber terrorism is widely recognized.
Furthermore, there is a growing consensus that everyone in every sector
and private

both public

is affected in some way (Hyman, 2013). Although nations have dedicated

significant funds to cyber protection measures, the extent of damage imposed by cyber
criminals is difficult to estimate (Hyman, 2013). In addition, no quantifiable metrics
presently exist to account for potential cyber-crimes and cyber terrorism attacks that will
emerge in the future. According to a study conducted by Symantec Corporation (Hyman,
2013), cyber-crime is estimated to incur $110 billion in costs per year. Yet, McAfee
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Incorporation estimated that the actual impact is closer to $1 trillion (Hyman, 2013).
Experts at McAfee stated that their assessment was based on financial losses through
both malicious and accidental infringement on security (Hyman, 2013). However,
McAfee also agreed that there is no definitive way to measure every aspect of data loss.
    

   

    

 

   

    

 

degrades consumer trust, thus, representing one of the most difficult costs to estimate
(Hyman, 2013). Irrespective of the type of loss, the disparity between the estimates
provided by the two organizations is significant, suggesting the presence of inexplicable
barriers to accurate reporting.
In many cases, companies victimized by cyber-crime decide not to report the
breach for a variety of reasons, the perceived adverse impact on business operations
being the most likely one (Hyman, 2013). Other inhibitions involve reluctance to report
the crime to the police. A study conducted by Ernst and Young in 2003 indicated that
merely one-quarter of all potential frauds was reported to law enforcement agencies. The
survey findings also revealed that only 28% of respondents were satisfied with the
investigation results (J. Smith, 2003; R. G. Smith, 2003). In Australia, for example, the
following factors were identified as the main inhibitors to reporting cyber-crime to
police:


A belief that the breach was minor and not worthy of police attention



Concerns regarding potential backlash from consumers



Concerns related to negative publicity;



Lack of credible (or any) proof



Reluctance to prosecute
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Other contributing factors were fears of business loss due to electronic systems being
down during repairs to security (R. G. Smith, 2003). In some cases, jurisdiction issues
impeded the cyber-crime investigation and prosecution of perpetrators. For instance, the
Internet provides a platform for international cyber-crime to occur, as the widespread
interconnectivity allows the victim to reside in one country while the perpetrator is in
another country (R. G. Smith, 2003). Jurisdiction also affects prosecution success, as it
introduces unique barriers to logistics and practicalities. For instance, time zone
differences often make investigations inconvenient for at least one party involved in
investigative activities (R. G. Smith, 2003). Similarly, the need for multilingual
translation and interpreters could incur substantial costs, and given that such activities
can be time-consuming, they hamper investigation progress. The priorities assigned to
different types of crime can also pose a significant barrier to the overall crime
investigation. For example, economic cyber-crimes are usually given lower priority
relative to violent cyber-crimes (R. G. Smith, 2003). Suspect attribution across an
enfranchised domain presents significant issues as well. R. G. Smith (2003) also
demonstrated that identity concealment or misrepresentation of self could be conducted
utilizing on-line technologies, such as proxies. Identity concealment enables attributable
identities to be easily stolen, allowing the e-commerce technologies with public key
infrastructures and/or digital signatures to be manipulated (R. G. Smith, 2003). This
manipulation can be achieved through providing false documents, supporting alternative
identities, rather than true identities. Thus, with seemingly sound identification, it is
possible for offenders to register and obtain the public-private key pair (a hallmark of
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secure data transfer) using registration authority to access secure transactions (R. G.
Smith, 2003).
Threats and Vulnerabilities
The quantity and complexity of advanced persistent threats (APT) or cyberattacks have dramatically increased in recent years. An APT is a level of persistence in a
computing system that allows an attacker at-will access regardless of security constraints
(Messmer, 2011). Thus, responding to such threats requires automated solutions that
combat APT vulnerabilities in virtually every aspect of our lives. A White House report
released in May 2014 suggested that Americans used approximately 500 million Internetcapable devices at home including, but not limited to, Smartphones, tablets, and other
Internet-connected devices that run various unimpeded and parallel applications that
connect to the web (Wheeler, 2014). Given its high degree of connectivity to the external
network, the Smart Home environment is not immune to the paradigm of an APT or
cyber-attacks. The home has evolved to become one of the most promising markets for
new IoE/IoT developments. It is envisaged that IoE/IoT will embrace technologies
emerging in the field of pervasive computing and will offer extensive diversity as it
pertains to the types of technology that converge to a single gateway in the home. In
2010, according to the FCC, 78% of Americans used the Internet, and 65% had
broadband access at home (Horrigan, 2010). Emergent IoE/IoT devices will sustain
exponential growth, as more consumers are made aware of convenience capabilities
offered by IoE devices in the home. Consequently, the variety of IoE/IoT devices will
eventually create a chasm of unanswered security concerns.
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In May 2009, the White House Office of the Press Secretary explained the
benefits and dangers of an increasingly connected ubiquitous network, thus highlighting
cyber security as an essential aspect of the U.S. economy, national security interests, and
the American Military prowess (Theohary & Rollins, 2009). President Obama expressed
his concern about the catastrophic effects that a relaxed approach to cyber security could
      

                

world, acts of terror could come not only from a few extremists in suicide vests but from
a few keystrokes on the computer
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which the dynamics of terrorism can conceivably effect information networks (Theohary
& Rollins, 2009). In making this statement, the president is acknowledging the
possibilities of cyber wars and cyber terrorism.
Originally, the utility of control systems, such as those related to IoT security, was
limited as their more widespread usage was prevented by the inadequate protocol
knowledge by the public. As a result, minimal efforts were made to enhance the security
of the control system network, focusing on the physical measures instead (Fenrich, 2007,
2008). Today, this is no longer possible due to the sheer amount of data that is
transmitted and stored in such systems, causing most control systems to become
connected (always available for data transmission), rather than operating as stand-alone
systems (Fenrich, 2007, 2008). Yet, while advantageous, this connectivity increases
vulnerabilities and threats. Given that Smart Homes maintain continuous connectivity for
home monitoring purposes, the programs required to provide this functionality share
similar risks (Fenrich, 2007, 2008).
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Control systems manufacturers have become aware of the vulnerabilities and
threats they face (Fenrich, 2007, 2008). This discovery prompted the responsible parties
to enact different initiatives, which focused on increasing the awareness of the public in
regards to the growing prevalence and extent of potential threats. The added focus also
meets the purpose of threat mitigating initiatives, e.g., establishing ways to reduce
vulnerabilities through different mechanisms, including training programs, awareness and
education, and the establishment of security priorities, thus reducing the potential
onslaught of threats. The initiatives towards vulnerability and threat mitigations confirm
the growing awareness of the fact that issues of this nature can never be fully understood
and resolved unless adequate knowledge of the risks imposed by control system usage
and capabilities exists. Thus, threats and vulnerabilities can be further categorized as
internal and/or external (Fenrich, 2007, 2008).
Internal Threats
Internal threats can be classified as accidental or intentional, whereby the former
occur due to a lack of knowledge or inattention (Fenrich, 2007, 2008). Accidental threats
are common to complex policies, operations, or lack of data confidentiality. On the other
hand, intentional threats are a result of intentional actions, such as data theft (Fenrich,
2007, 2008).
External Threats
In the context of the present study, a web-enabled technology represents a
physical product or a device-associated service that consumers use through, or in
conjunction with, the World Wide Web (Jones & Schneier, 1995). New web-enabled
technology requires the establishment of a baseline level of network security resilience.
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External threats arise from the use of malware, or activities of hackers and terrorists.
Malware includes items such as spyware, trojans, viruses, and worms. Malware attacks
are usually indirect, suggesting that there is no blatant attack on the system, but rather a
systematic attack or theft of information. Typically, the goal of malware is to cause
communication obstruction, data corruption, installation of backdoors for remote viewing
and control, or forced shutdowns, all of which have a negative impact on information
systems (Fenrich, 2007, 2008). Hackers are commonly external entities interested in
penetrating another system to gain information, intrude on privacy, or gain control of a
system. Terrorists, on the other hand, usually target the most critical infrastructure
systems, especially those the targeted country requires for operation, such as electricity,
water supply, traffic management, and a myriad of other categories of control systems.
As a result, this particular threat is a major concern for those that maintain the critical
infrastructures, such as governmental agencies and large corporate organizations. The
primary difference between hackers and terrorists is that terrorists focus on causing harm
to people, whereas hackers aim to disrupt systems or obtain information.
CIA Triad
Establishing the aforementioned security baseline is a critical task that must be
completed to meet the needs of consumers and manufacturers alike. For instance, the
CIA Triad (Data Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability) is the basis for fundamental
concepts regarding how technology manufacturers balance security for emerging webenabled technologies. Furthermore, through the CIA Triad, the theoretical design model
for balancing baseline network security is established (Ning, Liu, & Yang, 2013). The
model can be ascribed to several social theories because of the purpose of network
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design. For instance, most networks are used to allow a user faster access to the Internet,
while increasing the capacity to accomplish disparate tasks. Therefore, in order to allow
technology to improve lives, technology developers must understand not only the
associated technology but the people that use it as well (Kleine, 2015).
During the 1980s, the Actor-Network Theory (ANT) was developed (Kleine,
2015). ANT theory focuses on socio-technical systems and the way they are represented
as actor networks. These actors include formal/informal processes, technology, and
human actions to initiate and complete processes. In addition, for processes to function in
the network, they must be involved in some relation with each other, indicating that all
processes, technology, and human actions within the network exert a significant influence
on one another (Kleine, 2015). The ANT theory is particularly useful in relation to new
software. For example, ANT is helpful in analyzing new software user interface actions
within networks relating to other actors, whereby it affects the ability of the network to
enable or prevent actions taken by other actors (Kleine, 2015). As a result, based on the
  


     

            

     

  

  

    

influence the result in a variety of ways.
The Capability Approach (CA) is another relevant social theory because it
describes development in more than economic terms. Its application thus allows human
development to have an influence on the design of products and technologies. The cocreator of this approach was the Nobel-prize winning economist Amartya Sen.
According to Sen, development is based on the processes involved in establishing and/or
expanding real freedoms enjoyed by people (Kleine, 2015). This view suggests that
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freedoms are not a prerequisite for a quality of life to be maintained. Therefore, as an
actively maintained quality of life is posited to enable people to have enhanced choices,
this suggests a link between social theories and network design (Kleine, 2015). The
relevance of the CA theory to the technological advances is evident due to the ability of
experts to trace the development processes and to examine the manner in which
technology influences life. As a result, social theories are useful in the design and
development of technology because they are primarily based on a comprehensive sociotechnical analysis. Social theories mostly focus on human needs and expectations, while
also accounting for constraints imposed by the design. This social theory analysis is
useful for identifying design process challenges (Kleine, 2015).
In order to adequately respond to the increasing number of threats and
vulnerabilities, many organizations use the CIA Triad. The CIA Triad model is the
benchmark against which effectiveness of any given information systems security is
measured, in terms of its ability to repel and detect emerging threats and vulnerabilities.
Within the Triad, confidentiality focuses on data security and privacy; integrity pertains
to maintaining data in its current form, and availability relates to ensuring that the data is
provided to and/or is easily obtained by those that need the data (Fenrich, 2007, 2008).
Control systems, as well as Smart Home technologies, utilize the CIA Triad,
albeit in reverse order. In this case, availability and integrity are of higher importance
than confidentiality. A higher emphasis is placed on availability because the system must
always be usable. At the same time, it is assumed that Smart Home technology does not
typically have much, if any, sensitive data. Due to the reverse nature of the CIA Triad in
this situation, additional issues can arise. Moreover, when Smart Home technology
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devices aggregate, the potential exists to perpetuate an environment of highly volatile
network vulnerabilities. These diverse network vulnerabilities enable a growing surface
upon which a fundamentally different age of cyber security emerges (Roberts, 2014).
Now, more than ever, the need for continual testing and patching for vulnerabilities in
emerging technologies has become paramount (Protalinski, 2014).
The Internet of Everything (IoE) and the Internet of Things (IoT)

    

 

 



   

   

greater automation, error reduction, and efficiency improvements, was first introduced in
2000 by the founders of the MIT Auto-ID Center (Gérald, 2010; Sundmaeker et al.,
2010). At the time, IoT technologies encompassed simple technologies, e.g., bar codes,
smart cards, sensors, voice recognition, biometrics, and since 2003, Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) (Gérald, 2010; Sundmaeker et al., 2010). In September 2003, the
Auto-ID Center officially launched the concept of the EPC (Electronic Product Code)

               groundbreaking capability
introduced a technology infrastructure that served as a tracking mechanism for computers
to automatically identify man-made objects while encompassing an entire logistical
lifecycle, from plant to distribution centers (Gérald, 2010; Sundmaeker et al., 2010). The
Symposium attendees concurred with the view that RFID would become a key enabling
technology for economic growth for the next fifty years, inciting a fundamental shift from
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et al., 2010).
IoE and IoT are related to interconnectivity and device intelligence. IoE and IoT
will grow in prominence, as future sensory technology will more commonly support IoE
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and IoT use case applications. Furthermore, these sensors would be smaller and serve
multiple purposes (Noor, 2015). Thus, devices would be more intelligent through deep
learning, which is a process that consists of using algorithms designed to allow
experience and observations to teach machines. Therefore, it is envisaged that IoE, IoT,
and interconnectivity will influence all aspects of daily life. In the business industry, IoE
and IoT will be responsible for improved productivity, innovation, and/or economic
opportunities, due to lower costs, higher efficiency, and autonomous engagement (Noor,
2015). Overall, through IoE and IoT, connections will be made between people and
things, transforming heterogeneous data into data that can be used to assist in creating
new ways of completing previously impossible tasks or improving current processes
(Noor, 2015).
SmartThings, a sophisticated Smart Home technology company, has developed a
platform allowing objects commonly found in homes (such as doors or locks)
autonomously to prioritize the usage needs of the owner (Moad, 1997). To establish the
SmartThings platform, the owner needs a starter kit (currently retailing at $200) and a
Smartphone. The aim of SmartThings is to connect all technologies that should be
interconnected (Moad, 1997). Modern ubiquitous device interconnectivity is vastly
different from initial Smart Home technology attempts during the 1950s, which failed, in
part, due to inadequate technology. SmartThings, noted for its change in the home
automation processes, focused on the use of cloud computing to connect to the IoT, thus
allowing for remote monitoring and controlling of sophisticated devices using
Smartphone applications and cloud technology (Moad, 1997).
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It is expected that 11% of homes will have cloud-connected security systems by
the end of 2016, increasing to 35% by 2021 (Zalud, 2014). In addition, 13% of homes
will have smart thermostats within 2016, increasing to 43% by 2021. An expected 22%
of wearable fitness devices will be adopted by the end of 2016, increasing to 43% by
2021 (Zalud, 2014). Despite these expected adoption rates, IoT is currently insufficiently
advanced for the related infrastructure to support the increase in the number and type of
gadgets available (Zalud, 2014). At the same time, it is envisaged that IoT will extend to
other fields, such as home security and automation of devices, including healthcare
devices, which will affect the entire Smart Home ecosystem (Zalud, 2014). Thus, IoE,
 

 

 

      

  

(Oriwoh & Conrad, 2015; Oriwoh & Williams, 2014). As a result of this expansion in
scope and functionality, IoE and IoT will present global challenges as Smart Home
manufacturers out-produce their ability to contain security. Additionally, it is critical to
ensure that the devices comprising the IoT ecosystem possess and maintain
authentication methods to protect successfully against attacks directed at legacy systems
(Beekman & Thompson, 2014; Demblewski, 2015). Fortunately, most authentications
occur in proximity to the susceptible device(s). Proximity-based authentication
vulnerabilities are easily combated by reducing emanations or beacon power. However,
this aspect is most likely not within the scope of control for the homeowner; rather, it is
inherent to the specifications set by the manufacturer. Hence, further research is needed
to determine if manufacturers even consider this type of threat.
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Vulnerabilities and Solutions of IoE and IoT
Some academics believe that IoT began with the concept of distributed
computing, leading to enhanced communication technologies. From this relatively
simplistic perspective, IoT can be viewed as a means of connecting physical devices to
one another, allowing a contextual relationship of services, and establishing a global
network of ubiquitous devices (Popescul & Georgescu, 2013). The basis of IoT is the
ability to allow many different devices that have different capabilities to sense and
communicate with each other (Albert, 2015). Furthermore, as more corporations add IoT
to their supply chains, the risks of cyber intrusions will exponentially increase (Krause,
2015). It is thus envisaged that the significance of IoT will substantially increase as more
people and companies become technologically grounded. Ultimately, according to some
researchers, IoT is based on those non-electronic devices that have been embedded with
intelligence (through sensors and other devices) and connectivity capabilities
(Ramanathan, 2015). At the same time, IoT is not expected to remain a small component
of cyberspace. Rather, it is anticipated to be a dominant factor in the future. Yet, as IoT
increases in importance, issues will arise due to trust management

a concept that is

presently virtually non-existent in relation to IoT (Ramanathan, 2015).
Concerns about trust, privacy, and security began with the advent of Smartphones.
Growing popularity of Smartphone devices prompted privacy and security concerns due
to the volume of personal information obtained from, stored on, and shared by the
devices and different device apps (Waltzman & Shen, 2015). Private information
social network information, communications, and banking information

was available on

the device and was susceptible to hacking or theft. Therefore, as Smartphones can be
35

connected to the Internet (including wearables), the general security of IoT can be
compromised (Waltzman & Shen, 2015). According to Hodgson (2015), IoT
advancements will have a significant effect on technology-dense industries

including

home security, smart cars, Smart Homes, industrial sensors, mobile devices, and smart
cities because of the diverse concepts defining the purposes and applications of IoT
(Hodgson, 2015). Although interconnected devices (such as Smart Home devices) offer
significant benefits and are supposedly convenient for users, such devices are also
capable of obtaining and storing highly sensitive information about the user (Waltzman &
Shen, 2015). Krause (2015) reported that, between 2013 and 2014, the extent of
vulnerabilities increased by 62% (Krause, 2015). This upward trend confirms the
increased capacity and susceptibility of IoT to the continually emerging exploitation of its
data (Popescul & Georgescu, 2013). In the context of corporate IoT, vulnerability
scanning surpassed 458% in the same period, and were typically caused by linkages
between supply chains and internal business processes (Krause, 2015). According to
Hodgson (2015), by 2018, the sensor market will be worth approximately $4 billion,
while the value of connected devices will increase to approximately $38.5 billion by 2020
(Hodgson, 2015). The use of sensors is important because they are the necessary
component for establishing a relationship between virtual and physical worlds, which
allows for reactions from the sensors to the current environment (Popescul & Georgescu,
2013). Therefore, there are multiple opportunities for data collection by companies.
Analysis of this information and other collected data allows a detailed profile to be
compiled. As a result, those companies that obtain this information can make accurate
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forecasts of consumer activity. Many consumers view these analyses as privacy invasive
(Waltzman & Shen, 2015).
As IoT is still a relatively new market, the design of IoT devices is likely to
present some inherent issues (Hodgson, 2015). Furthermore, IoT offers a new threshold
for cyber criminals to attack, which has resulted in a research gap regarding current
security framework approaches in relation to technology advancements (Demblewski,
2015). Therefore, policymakers acknowledge possible IoT device implications
(Waltzman & Shen, 2015). Issues are also foreseen for the future, as many commercial
IoT applications are expected to exist in many new areas (Hodgson, 2015). Thus,
policymakers, not only in the United States but also around the world, are developing
ways to ensure that privacy and security standards are efficient and are upheld by the
companies distributing and/or selling IoT devices. At the same time, policymakers are
cautious to ensure that these standards do not impede IoT innovation (Waltzman & Shen,
2015). For example, in 2013, the FTC entered the debate as actions were taken against
Trend Net, Inc. In this situation, it was alleged that hackers were able to access the
FT

   

     

This cyber intrusion led the FTC to establish

expectations of the companies offering IoT devices in 2015 (Waltzman & Shen, 2015).
The report generated by the FTC was based on the findings of a 2013 workshop,
during which the participants were encouraged to provide feedback with suggestions,
along with listing the issues with IoT, and discussing necessary steps to resolve these
problems (Waltzman & Shen, 2015). Significantly, the new FTC report considered many
of the same privacy principles and recommendations that it had suggested in earlier
reports concerning PCs and applied them to IoT devices. The report recommends that
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security and privacy be integrated and enhanced through the design of new devices
(Waltzman & Shen, 2015).
Thus, it is recommended that IoT device manufacturers conduct a security risk
assessment during the design process. Furthermore, the FTC suggested that external
vendors that are hired must be able to maintain security, while the company should retain
the responsibility for the oversight of the overall security (Waltzman & Shen, 2015). The
FTC suggests that data minimization occurs through limitations put in place for obtaining
and storing consumer data. However, it is also known that IoT devices allow companies
to collect data about consumers, and this practice is considered to be of significant benefit
for future business retention (Waltzman & Shen, 2015). Despite the obvious benefits, the
FTC cautions that the use of this data may compromise privacy through the accumulation
of data, which may encourage hackers to steal the information. Furthermore, the FTC
posits that the utilization of this information may compromise privacy because consumers
may not anticipate specific uses of their data (Waltzman & Shen, 2015). As a result, the
FTC suggested the establishment of specific limits regarding data collection by
companies, both sensitive and non-sensitive. It is also important for these companies to
destroy data when the data relevancy or need expires (Waltzman & Shen, 2015).
The FTC also recognized the need for consumer disclosure and choice, while
acknowledging that this can be challenging in the context of IoT. The obstacle to
absolute disclosure of IoT devices is partially due to many devices not containing any
form of a user interface (Waltzman & Shen, 2015). This constraint prompted the FTC
recommendation that no choice be offered to consumers, provided the use of the
information remained consistent with the interaction (Waltzman & Shen, 2015). On the
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other hand, if the use of information is inconsistent with the interaction, notification
should be provided to consumers, allowing them to choose if and in what manner their
data can be utilized. This freedom of choice includes the option to decline participation
(Waltzman & Shen, 2015).
Also in 2015, the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation began discussing IoT issues. In the accompanying hearing, the
Committee heard from different experts that provided information regarding various
topics. Among the topics was the consideration of how to protect consumer privacy and
provide security, while simultaneously establishing a necessary balance of innovation and
growth (Waltzman & Shen, 2015). This balance was considered especially important to
some experts because it is expected that IoT would benefit retail and industrial industries
the most. Furthermore, major concerns were raised regarding security, with one expert
arguing that it is necessary to establish necessary security implementation during the
design process, as well as during the manufacturing process (Waltzman & Shen, 2015).
The FTC also recommends educating consumers about data use, privacy, and security, as
well as providing transparency in the applicable industry. Despite these
recommendations, the majority of the experts at the hearing did not recommend rushing
to regulate IoT (Waltzman & Shen, 2015). In fact, the prevalent view was that
consumers and entrepreneurs should have the choice to pursue the path towards IoT,
rather than being impeded by regulations imposed by the government. Thus, the hearing
attendees acknowledged implications and promise for immense benefits relating to IoT
use and installation (Waltzman & Shen, 2015).
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In the European Union (EU), IoT privacy and security issues are widely
acknowledged, and relevant bodies have worked towards resolving them since 2014. The
EU passed Article 29 focusing on data protection, which articulated concerns regarding
IoT, akin to the FTC report (Waltzman & Shen, 2015). However, the EU member state
representatives are more concerned about user awareness of data collection and
processing, as well as the volume of data being collected by IoT devices. Thus, this lack
of awareness suggests that there is a significant challenge in demonstrating that there is
valid consent by consumers according to laws and regulations in the EU (Waltzman &
Shen, 2015). Furthermore, the amount of data collected and its retention could already be
leading to violations of laws and regulations within the EU. Thus the EU mandated that
IoT data can only be kept for a specified period, typically for as long as necessary for the
intended purpose to be accomplished. This restriction implied that secondary
repurposing and profiting from data usage statistics that are not related to the original
purpose might be in violation of EU laws and regulations due to a lack of consumer
consent (Waltzman & Shen, 2015). Therefore, there is immense interest in IoT privacy
and security issues, resolutions of which have been guided by FTC reports and Article 29.
However, within the EU, Article 29 has a greater impact than the FTC report (Waltzman
& Shen, 2015), because the latter focused on best practice recommendations and policies,
whereas the former pertains to EU law compliance. Significantly, the FTC did not
require regulation of IoT issues through legislation because of the expected rate of
technology evolution, implying that any legislation would be premature (Waltzman &
Shen, 2015). Ultimately, the FTC report provides a framework for future laws and
regulations as well as their enforcement. Thus, companies should follow the FTC report
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recommendations, as well as Article 29, to ensure compliance with both the U.S. and EU
regulations (Waltzman & Shen, 2015). Because national governmental bodies are
increasingly focusing on these issues, cyber-crime related to IoT is an issue that has
gained prominence globally (Scott, 2015). However, governments of some countries are
taking no efforts to protect their systems and citizens from cyber-attacks enabled by IoT
vulnerabilities (Scott, 2015). On the other hand, some businesses require multilayer
protection, especially in consideration of IoT payment devices (Scott, 2015).
Some experts recommend prohibiting default passwords because they make it
easier for hackers to break into the system. Furthermore, providers and product
incorporation must be chosen based on security levels offered (Hodgson, 2015).
Industries must consider vulnerabilities, such as increased data collection, which may
make them a target for theft. As a result, it is beneficial to increase mobile security and
understand the risks inherent in utilizing IoT devices. This risk transference leads to
conclusions that wireless networks are the source of the greatest risk (Hodgson, 2015).
For example, the first worm known as the Morris Worm was created in 1988. As of
2014, cyber-crime has cost more than $400 billion worldwide (Scott, 2015). At the same
time, IoT has ethical issues attached to it, namely:


Ubiquity



Invisibility



Ambiguity



Difficult identification



Ultra-connectivity



Autonomous and unpredictable behavior
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Incorporated intelligence
Difficult to control
Each of these factors has different issues attached to them. For example, as IoT devices
decrease in size, they will be less visible, thus masking obtrusiveness. Reduced visibility
will allow them to observe interactions without being detected, thus becoming more
intrusive to privacy (Popescul & Georgescu, 2013).
However, it is undeniable that the rapid development of IoT will cause a
transformation in not only business but private lives as well. Not all consequences can be
predicted easily (O'Brien, 2015). This difficulty stems from IoT still being largely
undeveloped. It can be expected, however, for IoT to impact product liability (O'Brien,
2015). The newly developed smart devices will have a tremendous effect on the world
and IoT in particular. For example, as highlighted by the 2015 FTC report, IoT and smart
devices have increased susceptibility to unauthorized access, as well as personal
identification/information theft and misuse (O'Brien, 2015). This information can lead to
attacks on other systems, such as the Anthem attack. It is also argued that these same
risks exist for traditional equipment, such as computers and networks (O'Brien, 2015).
Yet, the risks inherent in IoT are much greater than those associated with traditional
computers. This perceived risk arises because IoT has evolved into what is currently
termed    

 (O'Brien, 2015). Through the information gathered and

stored in data storage centers, users are vulnerable to identity theft, yet consumers argue
that the benefits, such as increased efficiency, outweigh the risks (O'Brien, 2015).
In 2014, Goldman Sachs issued a report suggesting that IoT is adaptable through
wearable devices, smart cars, Smart Homes, Smart Cities, and the Industrial Internet.
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Furthermore, IoT has been driven by different forces, such as IoT strength, due to
decreased costs, the use of Smartphones and increased wireless coverage, revenue
generation, and increased productivity, leading to reduced expenses (O'Brien, 2015). The
acceptance of IoT was illustrated at the 2015 Consumer Electronics Show, where over
900 technologies were showcased. The number of connectable products increases daily
(O'Brien, 2015). Consumers utilize IoT for energy savings and efficiency, as well as to
be able to remotely correct problems relating to the home. Thus, presenting an increased
opportunity for privacy violations and external/unauthorized interference with the
systems (O'Brien, 2015).
The number of vulnerabilities related to IoT devices is especially concerning
considering a 2014 Hewlett-Packard report indicating that 70% of devices are vulnerable
to external attacks. For instance, in 2014, there was an attack on a German steel plant
network (O'Brien, 2015). This cyber intrusion allowed the attackers to control the
network externally, preventing a blast furnace from shutting down, which caused
significant material damage (O'Brien, 2015). This intrusion is one of only two known
cyber-attacks that have caused physical harm

 



   

Natard

uranium plant through malware execution (O'Brien, 2015).
Other potential vulnerabilities can be found in smart televisions and lateral
systems that connect to the associated network (allowing for storing/transmittal of
personal information) including:


The use of IoT devices to attack personal or public networks and/or systems



Creating physical safety risks by, for example, affecting medical care
appliances connected to a home network
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Thus, according to the FTC 2015 report, the less expensive smart devices may have
increased risks due to lower security standards (O'Brien, 2015). In some cases, these
cheaper devices may not offer needed security updates or incorporate other security
protection features that may safeguard personal information. As a result, as technology
advances further, if corresponding security updates are not available, it is expected that
vulnerabilities will increase in the private sector (O'Brien, 2015). Criminal activity can
occur through malware that would not leave any apparent traces on the device, leaving
consumers unaware of the attack. At the same time, there are concerns relating to issued
patches, especially in the context of patch delivery (O'Brien, 2015). Other predictable
vulnerabilities from IoT devices pertain to software malfunctions causing damage to
property or person, external attacks, and identity theft through misappropriation of
personal data. In the business sector, such issues result in product liabilities (O'Brien,
2015).
In 2015, several IoT failures occurred. For example, in April, the wireless hub by
Wink failed, whereby all connected devices were disabled. Many potential breaches of
security occurred, as a result, increasing vulnerabilities, in particular, those associated
with home security systems (O'Brien, 2015). Another failure occurred within
Chamberlain and Ooma, caused by compromised IoT devices, disrupting services,
potentially affecting   

   (O'Brien, 2015).

In 2015, the first IoT class action took place due to a report by U.S. Senator
Edward Markey. The action involved Toyota, Ford, and GM automobile manufacturers
(O'Brien, 2015). The action was prompted by an investigation spearheaded by Markey in
response to studies revealing presence of significant IoT vulnerabilities to car systems
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that pose significant risks to the safety of drivers. The investigation detailed the
following vulnerabilities (O'Brien, 2015):
Potential privacy intrusions through wireless technologies in the car systems
Lack of awareness of intrusion possibilities
Inconsistent, inadequate, and/or haphazard security measures for protection
against remote access
Lack of ability to diagnose or respond to intrusions
Over-reliance on technology that is not designed for security protections
related to IoT devices
Other privacy concerns are raised in relation to navigation systems in automobiles, which
could be used to monitor the location of the vehicle, prompting privacy invasions. Thus,
owing to the failure of these companies to enhance electronic security, it was argued that
the warranties were violated, and the vehicles were defective (O'Brien, 2015).
In other cases, threats have been identified through commercial aircraft safety,
considering that many IoT devices onboard an aircraft are connected to the Internet.
Thus, the electronics system controlling the aircraft could have unauthorized access
opportunities (O'Brien, 2015). Therefore, it is unsurprising that IoT has been argued to
pose the highest risks to security, along with de-globalization and supernatural category
storms. Part of this risk is due to the number of incidences where automated systems
replace humans, allowing for much greater opportunities for unauthorized access to
systems (O'Brien, 2015). In this context, IoT device malfunctions are concerning,
especially those related to critical infrastructures (O'Brien, 2015).
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IoT vulnerabilities pose increased risks to vendors, due to the loss of protection
against third-party injury claims (O'Brien, 2015). In fact, many software vendors are
unaware of these increased risks relating to product liability exposure due to IoT devices
and have not stated provisions in warranty agreements (O'Brien, 2015). Without specific
provisions and in the absence of standards for IoT device protections, consumers are not
afforded protection relating to IoT device failures (O'Brien, 2015).
Short-term concerns include a lack of standards for IoT devices, which affects all
stakeholders of the company. Therefore, IoT companies are vulnerable when incidents
occur (O'Brien, 2015). One of the principal arguments generating claims and lawsuits
will be a lack of governance by the companies to account for IoT protections, as well as
absence or inadequacy of safety standards. Standards are being created by the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU), based on the creation of a threat model for risks. As a part of this initiative,
proprietary standards are also being implemented by organizations but are not yet
completed (O'Brien, 2015). Yet, it is argued that IoT cannot be 100% secure, despite all
regulatory attempts (O'Brien, 2015).
Smart Home Technology
Akin to control systems, Smart Home technology ecosystems involves a diverse
array of automation systems. It is now possible to program different electronic
equipment (such as a home stereo system) to turn on at a predetermined time. These
tasks, once requiring manual completion, can be controlled using a Smartphone that acts
as a remote control for the home (Pfledderer, 2015). In 2015, the Smart Home
technology was valued at approximately $60 billion. When the Smart Home technology
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first emerged, its purpose was to automate routine household tasks. The Smart Home
could be programmed to alter the thermostat and thus ensure that the ambient temperature
reaches a specific setting at a certain time, turn on electronics remotely, automatically
turn on exterior lights (similar to motion detector lights), turn on outside irrigation (such
as sprinklers), and other tasks. Today, Smart Home technology has evolved to create one
platform, such as an app, to integrate all Smart Home technologies involved. These may
include electronics (stereo or television), lights (outside or inside lights), and/or irrigation
(Pfledderer, 2015). Wink, for example, was developed by General Electric and Quirky
and currently has the capacity to integrate approximately 25 devices with one remote
control. According to the company, the purpose of this technology is to solve everyday
problems. Most importantly, the technology is adaptable to all needs (Pfledderer, 2015).
Despite the benefits for many users, the Smart Home market is facing some
difficulties. Research conducted by the Consumer Electronics Association and Parks
Association shows that most consumers (approximately two-thirds) that have broadband
access in their households have little or no familiarity with the Smart Home technologies
and often do not know where Smart Home technologies can be purchased (Pfledderer,
2015). Therefore, the market has not yet been adapted to the new technologies.
Moreover, as the use of this technology becomes more prevalent, new vulnerabilities and
opportunities for cyber-crime will emerge (Pfledderer, 2015).
Available data indicates that millions of homeowners are embracing Smart Home
technology such as wireless X10, ZigBee, and Z-Wave devices to enhance flexibility
and save time. Smart technology devices include wireless doorbells, appliance controls,
wireless smoke detectors, and wireless light switches (Srinivasan, 2012). The acceptance
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and use of Smart Home technology is unsurprising considering the role that technology
plays in modern society. For example, technology has been developed over recent
decades to improve and/or enhance social welfare. Social welfare has realized new ways
for interaction to occur between humans and the environment, as well as with those
computational things of interest (Mendes, Godina, Rodrigues, Matias, & Catalão, 2015).
Recently, technology has been utilized to increase comfort and well-being, as evident in
the growing use of social theories in technology design. Energy consumption/reduction
monitoring is one of the many ways through which well-being has been enhanced, and
this initiative was a result of concerns considering the growing use of resources (Mendes
et al., 2015).
According to Mendes et al. (2015), Smart Home technology is a response to four
different factors:
Significant advances in semiconductor technology, which have allowed
computing and electronic devices to become an integral part of daily life
Increased processing power for microcontroller units
Integration of small sensor nodes that are capable of maintaining data through
complex techniques
Rapid development of wireless technology (Mendes et al., 2015)
Therefore, major market brands are intently focused on making the household products
with a frequent turnover more intelligent (e.g., appliances, Smartphones, multimedia
systems, lighting, heating, and home alarm systems). One of the enabling
communication standards that connect the aforementioned categories of devices is ZWave technologies. Z-Wave is a highly compatible wireless technology typically
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employed in residential environments for controlling systems, monitoring devices, and
reading device statuses (Z-Wave_Alliance, 2015). Despite the potentially positive
aspects of greater reliance on technology, homes are left vulnerable through different
threats, such as Smart Home technology and mobile device design vulnerabilities
(Wright, 2008).
Smart Home Technology Vulnerabilities
Tripwire, a Smart Home security company, has found vulnerabilities in three
popular Smart Home hubs

SmartThings, Vera Control, and Wink (Lemos, 2015). Due

to these vulnerabilities, Smart Homes are more likely to be targeted by hackers. Web
sites of applications designed to be malicious serve as the common vector used by
attackers to exploit vulnerabilities and allow unauthorized users to gain control of Smart
Home hubs. To determine vulnerabilities, Tripwire has tested the hubs and has
uncovered critical flaws. These critical flaws represent vulnerabilities that could provide
opportunities for attackers to eavesdrop on communications or even take control of the
hub (Lemos, 2015). In November 2014, several common issues were found, such as
command injection that would provide root access to the Wink hub. According to Craig

   

       

discovered with little difficulty (Lemos,

2015). The main vulnerabilities in the Wink hub pertained to SQL-injections, which
could allow an attacker to issue commands to other smart devices, access unauthorized
functions to the hub and wireless network, or even establish and load a backdoor (Lemos,
2015; Microsoft_Security_Bulletin_MS10-089, 2010). Immediately upon discovering
the vulnerabilities, Wink repaired the flaws. Vera Control vulnerabilities stem from
cross-site request forgery (CSRF) issues. CSRF issues have the potential to allow
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nefarious computational instructions to be processed by the hub by permitting an
 

  

  

   



       -

controlled Web content, thus providing the attacker with unauthorized access to personal
information (Lemos, 2015). As of February 2015, Vera Control had not repaired the
issues. However, a minor security issue was found in the SmartThings hub, as it was
limited to the potential for eavesdropping in limited situations (Lemos, 2015).
SmartThings issued mitigations as a part of a mandatory automatic update for all active
hubs, while also allowing inactive hubs to connect to the SmartThings service and receive
the update. These types of hubs used in Smart Homes utilize embedded hardware, due to
which the built-in security is in most cases inferior to that found in traditional security
systems (Lemos, 2015). As a result, there are industry-wide problems caused by low-cost
embedded devices. Flaws inherent in these devices demonstrate that any error can cause
a significant vulnerability, causing immense damage and/or harm to the system. These
hubs lack basic protections provided by most modern operating systems for PCs (Lemos,
2015).
The issues uncovered by Tripwire confirmed the presence of concerns regarding
the ability of attackers to control Smart Home functionalities. For example, Smart Home
hubs are specifically designed to control different aspects of the home, such as lighting,
heating, irrigation, and even locks and cameras (Tripwire Inc., 2015a, 2015b). The issues
uncovered by Tripwire were especially concerning because they provided means for
successful exploitation, such as allowing hackers to determine when the house is empty
(Tripwire Inc., 2015a, 2015b). Consequently, it would be possible to utilize the network
to change settings within the Smart Home.
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While the use of Smart Home hubs has increased, functionality is still more
important than security, which is a common drawback of newer technologies. Young,
however, cautioned that, although the current threat is low, it would inevitably increase
(Tripwire Inc., 2015a, 2015b). This potential threat will occur because attackers will
eventually realize that a significant amount of information can be gained from attacking
these hubs (Tripwire Inc., 2015a, 2015b). Therefore, Smart Home hubs can be exploited
to decrease security in homes and/or cause physical damage to the home being attacked,
or even its occupants. Some Smart Home hubs are particularly vulnerable to executions
occurring through exoteric controls, which can allow hackers to hide on the network
(Tripwire Inc., 2015a, 2015b).
Risks users are exposed to are also becoming greater, given the increases in IoT
and communication abilities related to devices connected to IoT (ConsumerReports,
2015). Yet, these communication abilities offer convenience to consumers. Thus, there
must be a balance between practicality and protection, as Smart Home devices have
capabilities to send personal data to corporate servers, commonly used in ways that
consumers cannot control (ConsumerReports, 2015). Therefore, private information can
be collected, combined, and exploited. This aggregation commonly occurs by marketers,
but such data can also be stolen (ConsumerReports, 2015). The concerns regarding
stolen aggregated private information have led to politicians, such as U.S. Senator Ed
Markey, to call for more scrutiny regarding IoT. Markey argued that rules that are strong
and can be legally enforced to protect personal information are urgently needed
(ConsumerReports, 2015). There were approximately 109 million wearable devices in
use globally at the end of 2014. As a result, millions of data items was generated,
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confirming that technology is more advanced than current privacy laws
(ConsumerReports, 2015).
Smart Home vulnerabilities are a common fear of consumers. According to one
study by Veracode, reliance on smart devices increases vulnerabilities. As a part of this
investigation, R. Brown (2015) reviewed four manufacturers

Chamberlain,

SmartThings, Ubi, and Wink. The devices reviewed were MyQ Garage, MyQ Gateway,
home automation hub, voice recognition box, and hub and relay control panel (R. Brown,
2015). The following four categories were employed in the evaluation:



Potential vulnerabilities implicit in communication between devices and the
cloud



Potential vulnerabilities implicit in communication between the device and the
remote control




Potential vulnerabilities related to the device interfaces
Potential vulnerabilities pertaining to debugging interfaces, which might allow
unauthorized access to commands at the engineering level

The findings revealed that Ubi was the least protected (R. Brown, 2015). Many issues
affecting Ubi were identified, such as limited encryption during communications between
devices and the cloud, password requirement weaknesses, and few access restrictions to
its debugging interface (R. Brown, 2015).
These vulnerabilities through home automation technologies can allow anyone,
including those with limited technical abilities, to access properties all over the world.
Honeywell, known as one of the biggest U.S. technology manufacturers, has two such
flaws. Additionally, it is relatively
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Tuxedo Touch web interfaces through unauthorized access. As a result, those controlling
these interfaces have capabilities to manage the home components that are connected to



     (Fox-Brewster, 2015).

These flaws could provide an

attacker opportunity to control devices or processes, such as security cameras. Other
vulnerabilities found in the authentication procedure were significant because there was
no requirement for interactions between the attacker and the one being attacked (FoxBrewster, 2015). The flaws can also be utilized to provide information regarding when
homes are unoccupied. Furthermore, attackers can open the locks to the home without
authorization and/or change alarm settings. These activities also allow unauthorized
users to turn smart hubs into zombies through accessing local area networks (FoxBrewster, 2015). In other cases, a malicious web page can be used to provide the attacker
with complete and total access and control of the system through the exploitation of input
validation failures on the web interfaces. Through the exploitation possibilities found,
hackers would be able to utilize Smart Home technology vulnerabilities to use the hub for
distributed denial of service (DDoS) purposes (Tripwire Inc., 2015a, 2015b). Therefore,
as Tripwire shows, due to the serious flaws found in popular systems purchased, homes
may be at risk (Moore, 2015). Furthermore, although the threat is low, it is expected to
increase as technology becomes more prevalent and more homes become equipped with
Smart Home technologies (Moore, 2015). Thus, there are very real risks with numerous
points of entry. It is important for vendors to acknowledge these vulnerabilities as well
as provide regular updates aimed at mitigating them. Furthermore, consumers need to
recognize and understand the risks of Smart Home technology and apply the updates
(Moore, 2015).
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Extant studies suggest that over 1 billion connected devices used in millions of
Smart Homes will have emerged by 2017 (eRadar, 2015); Gartner & Gartner, 2015).
However, numerous vulnerabilities exist even in conjunction with single-function devices
(such as lights), as well as in fully automated homes (eRadar, 2015; Gartner & Gartner,
2015; Weinberg, Milne, Andonova, & Hajjat, 2015). Therefore, growing evidence of
access violations through smart devices to Smart Homes exists.
Currently, no major breach has been attributed to home security or a related
automation system; yet, due to the vulnerabilities, the potential exists (Griffin, 2014a).
Popular security expos routinely reveal practical research that validates the simplicity
involved in comprising basic security measures. For example, researchers have
demonstrated the ability to exploit a Samsung smart fridge through an invalid SSL
implementation (Venda, 2015). In fact, according to a Hewlett-Packard study, 70% of
common IoT devices have different vulnerabilities, such as password weaknesses, lack of
communications encryption, and lack of user access permissions (Griffin, 2014a). Other
vulnerabilities include potential for cyber intrusions and vulnerable systems, which may
allow hackers access because systems are commonly controlled through remote controls
(such as a Smartphone app or web portal), enabling criminals to break into Smartphones,
and/or tablets in order to steal private and/or corporate data (Griffin, 2014a). These
issues increase in scope and prevalence because the devices used in Smart Home
technology are non-intelligent and operate individually. As a result, they can be
controlled through remote functions. At the same time, since this technology is nonintelligent, they are afforded few authentication mechanisms, if any (Griffin, 2014a).
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Moreover, some devices are susceptible to user account resets due to insufficient
password and credential complexity in an attempt to retain simplicity for the typical daily
user (Neagle, 2015). As technicalities increase, vulnerabilities increase because
manufacturers failed to design these devices securely, depending instead on the end user
to secure the devices (Neagle, 2015). Thus, in some cases, Smart Home technology can
be disabled, allowing criminals time to enter the home, and then re-activate the system.
Some higher-end Smart Home products are appropriately focused on security in their
designs. This trend is expected to increase as the market and technology mature.
However, current IoT security standards continue to be developed and established
(Neagle, 2015).
Exploratory Research
The expansion of artificial intelligence (AI) in distributed computing platforms,
cloud technologies, ubiquitous devices, and Smart Home ecosystems has evolved the
notions of research in the field of computer science to include extended interpretations
(Sharoff, 1995). Sharoff's (1995) study is based on the assertion that a paradigm of
human-independent intelligent devices fits into philosophical investigations. According
to the author, in computer science, philosophical investigations can follow constructs
similar to those employed in the cognitive sciences. Marshall and Rossman (1999)
concurred with this view, further noting that exploratory research in the fields of
cognitive science and computer science helps determine how patterns are interrelated.
Ubiquitous devices and distributed computing systems involve many aspects that adapt
and learn as they interact and integrate information (Holland, 2006). The concept of
information integration of autonomous device interaction beyond human actions is used
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in the present study to discover naturalizations that occur and affect vulnerability
exposure and cyber security (Schroeder, 2015).
Other theoretical approaches to computer science research relevant to exploratory
  



 





ontological worldview (A. Brown, 2015). Brown suggested

that the widespread acceptance of information technology artifacts used in everyday life
stems from the seminal concept of existential ontology. In existential Heidegger
ontology, phenomenological research is conducted when the aim is to qualify variances
in organizational usage. The theoretical basis of Heidegger ontology, as applied to
phenomenological research in computer science, is limited to interpretivist and empirical
constructivist methods and implicitly demands that data collection involves some human
element (A. Brown, 2015)

  

 

  

 





ontological

research design, in the present study, it was not possible to provide a formulative
assessment of interactions between devices and the intuitive operation of the Smart Home
ecosystem.
Qualitative exploratory research is particularly useful for the scientific
community, as it facilitates conducting formulative research on integral parts of a
developing system (Silhavy, Senkerik, Oplatkova, Silhavy, & Prokopova, 2014). In such
an approach, data collection occurs through a wide array of systemic methods, including
interviews, participant reports, and detailed observations. While human involvement is,
as noted above, valuable, the researcher must remain minimally intrusive, to avoid
introducing bias in any observable results. Data analysis is equally comprehensive and
systemic, whereby the method of analysis follows the nature of the data itself (Waters,
n.d.). In addition, by identifying commonalities and correlations in data, common themes
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are allowed to emerge. This approach allows the researcher to assign meaning to abstract
variables which may or may not qualify as influential factors or essential aspects (Waters,
n.d.). The results yielded by qualitative exploratory research can unveil findings and
themes that relate to theories presented in empirical studies (Waters, n.d.). The
discussion of the findings and emergent themes not only helps elucidate the lived
experience but also expands on the themes pertinent to similar contexts described in other
sources.
Case Study
Case study approach is adopted when the goal is to conduct an empirical
evaluative inquiry into a phenomenon within its real-life context (Creswell, 2013;
Merriam, 2009; Simons, 2009; Yin, 2014). Case studies assist in evaluating emergent
technologies, due to the implicit assumption of contextual transference and
generalization. It is imperative to note that, in the context of the present study, these
assumptions were made solely in order to facilitate a high-level functional overview of
the particular capabilities of technology, aligned with the described CA theory. The case
study construct is significant to emergent technology capabilities as it draws an in-depth
singularity of a phenomenon being studied (Simons, 2009). The case study approach,
within the scope of emergent technology, helps explore the problems at the juncture of
Smart Home security and cyber intrusions, thus illuminating shared characteristics. More
specifically, in the present investigation, the case study is designed to provide insight into
inherent or overlooked Smart Home security issues, as a means of redrawing
generalizations pertinent to personal cyber security. This design framework enhances
collective understanding of relative tertiary effects (Merriam, 2009). Yin (2014)
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proposed a multiple case sampling procedure that aggressively evaluates cross-case
implications by refining initial theories and data collection methods, and subsequently
correlating findings with a series of cases (see Figure 2). Figure 2 depicts theory
development as the initial step in designing a case study. Once a theory is developed, the
researcher proceeds with case selection and defining specific measures in the data
collection process. Yin (2014) further explored how the conduct of each case study
report should evolve to refine and indicate the extent to which logic is replicated across
each case study. If required, the researcher then contrasts the results (represented by the
dash red line feedback loop). The steps associated with the depicted feedback process
represent a situation where important discovery occurs during the conduct of one of the
individual case studies, warranting reconsideration of one or more original theoretical
propositions (Yin, 2014). At the end of each case study, individual case reports are
written, as this assists in the development of cross-case conclusions and contributes to the
quality and comprehensiveness of the final case report.
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many countries to invest extensive funds into the prevention and the mitigation of
damage caused by cyber-attacks. The threat of cyber-attacks has increased and has
expanded into many different areas. In particular, organizations that handle sensitive data
(such as healthcare/insurance agencies and retailers) have become vulnerable, along with
users of smart equipment (such as appliances at home that are controlled remotely).
Evidence shows that the entire globe has become vulnerable to this threat, and the Smart
Home is no exception (Dunn Cavelty, 2014).
The exact cost of cyber-crime is difficult to estimate, not only because some
damage cannot be easily quantified, but also because such breaches are insufficiently
reported. Problems related to cyber-crime also involve investigation barriers, which
commonly enable perpetrators to continue to attack other victims. Due to the immense
media attention, fear of negative publicity or consumer backlash remains one of the major
investigation barriers (J. Smith, 2003). Inadequate security measures and numerous
vulnerabilities are partially the reason that cyber-crime threats exist. Therefore, as
technology usage increases, unless the security measures keep the pace, they will become
increasingly inadequate. Thus, more attacks will be attempted, many of which will be
successful. Common attack attempts using malware are becoming more advanced, more
common, and more dangerous.
The focus of the CIA Triad was to provide a framework to balance security and
technology advancement. The Triad focuses on benchmarking the effective security
measures and eliminating or decreasing risks. Although the Triad has been proven
effective, it cannot prevent all attacks, especially as they continue to advance is scope and
severity. The Triad, however, remains significant because it focuses on balancing
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acceptable levels of data security, accommodations for privacy, obtainable nonrepudiation levels, and consistent access (Fenrich, 2007, 2008). The most frequent
attacks occur against organizations that store and maintain substantial amounts of
sensitive data, including governmental agencies. The Smart Home ecosystem has yet to
suffer the same distributed onslaught of cyber intrusions. However, the dynamics and
diversity of the technologies introduced to the Smart Home broaden the attack surface
and invite the possibilities of complex cyber intrusions. As a result, cyber-attacks
threaten the validity and usefulness of the Triad. This threat is especially significant as it
is envisaged that Smart Home technology will become widespread.
Smart Home technology is part of IoE and IoT and can be used professionally and
personally. The goal of this type of technology is to enhance convenience while reaping
positive economic benefits. However, in order for these benefits to be fully realized,
cyber security that encapsulates the full extent of IoE and IoT is necessary, because only
such a comprehensive approach can assist in protecting all types of smart technology,
rather than relying on individualized security for specific products or brands. IoE and
IoT represent significant security challenges due to the complexity and diversity of the
devices utilized. Therefore, it is evident that some of the seemingly most convenient
devices and functionalities (such as the ability to turn the radio/stereo on) may become
the prominent focus of targeted cyber intrusions. Victims of such attacks are less likely
     



 

        

perpetuate

financial crimes, as they are rarely identified, yet, when compiled, manifest in significant
invasions. The Smart Home inherits the technology concepts introduced in IoT and IoE.
Thus, it is important to be aware of these vulnerabilities, failures in security, and potential
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vectors through which cyber-attacks can occur. In this way, security within the larger
architecture of the IoT, the IoE, and the Smart Home ecosystem can be increased or
improved to protect all users and all data.
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CHAPTER 3
Methodology
Overview of the Research
Yin (2014) employed the multiple case study inquiry as a method to evaluate
emergent technologies, as described in Chapter 2. This strategy was adopted in the
present study. The aim of the qualitative exploratory multiple case study inquiry
described in this work was to explore using open source tools and investigate the
behavioral heuristics of the Smart Home ecosystem at the data link level, observing frame
PDU data for TCP/UDP conversations. This necessitated constructing an IoT ecosystem,
comprising of a controlled Smart Home environment, which was observed during a
typical life cycle of initial configuration and routine usage tasks, whereby the data
collected was subsequently analyzed.
The chosen research approach embodies emergent object behavior present in the
Smart Home ecosystem. Case study research brings clarity to complex issues in the field
of IoT by extending the real-life experience and situational context, allowing the Smart
Home ecosystem to be examined. The case studies discussed here are only limited by
lack of understanding; hence, research in the field of Smart Home ecosystems can be
expanded to explore applications prominent in the cyber security field. When meeting
the aims of the present investigation, the case study approach was preferred to other
qualitative research strategies (e.g., experimentation, archival, and historical analysis)
because emergent object behavior and vulnerabilities in the Smart Home ecosystem can
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be observed in a real life application (Yin, 2014). It is assumed that cyber-attack
prevention in the resource-limited home environment is insufficiently combated using
conventional tools and applications, such as antivirus software, firewalls, and other
security measures (Agapov & Rahman, 2008). Additionally, practitioners in the field of
the Smart Home ecosystem development have identified areas of concern regarding
privacy and security in IoT (Albert, 2015; Babar, Stango, Prasad, Sen, & Prasad, 2011; R.
Brown, 2015; ConsumerReports, 2015; Demblewski, 2015; Neagle, 2015). Privacy and
security requirements in Smart Home ecosystem differ tremendously from those pertinent
to personal and mobile computing platforms (Albert, 2015; Babar et al., 2011; R. Brown,
2015; ConsumerReports, 2015; Demblewski, 2015; Neagle, 2015). As a part of the
present study, a vulnerability test was conducted, involving various wireless sensor
network (WSN) products, ubiquitous networks, and pervasive computing in the
categories of appliances, Smartphones, multimedia systems, lighting, heating, and home
alarm systems, all of which operate within the Smart Home domain. Moreover, devices
in the Smart Home domain either consume user data or traverse availability prioritized
architecture. The case studies described here were thus conducted in an attempt to
demonstrate that the LM-CIRT model can be successfully adopted to mitigate threats in
the Smart Home ecosystem. In the present study, it was also employed as a means of
performing an effective security assessment, as well as to implement an appropriate
threat mitigation in the Smart Home ecosystem (see Figure 5). The case study was
conducted in a controlled environment, which contained all of the products in the
aforementioned categories, described in more detail later in this chapter.
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Research Traditions
The research traditions discussed in Chapter 2 expound upon the nature of
exploratory research using a qualitative methodology as applied to Smart Home
ecosystems. In this study, exploratory research was based on the premise that a paradigm
of human-independent intelligent devices in a Smart Home ecosystem can represent the
independent interactions that can be observed from a cognitive notion of object behavior,
be it intentional or unintentional. The exploratory research framework meets the
objectives of discovering vulnerability exposure and cyber security implications by
defining the concepts by which information integration and autonomous device
interaction is recorded. In conjunction with the case study, exploratory research declares
the autonomy of emergent object behavior present in the Smart Home ecosystem.
Figure 3 depicts a recursive evaluation of the Smart Home ecosystem datalink
layer protocol data units from the existing Intrusion Kill Chain design model. The
proposed case study framework allows building the appropriate case while concurrently
developing the data collection methodology to obtain the anticipated results. Following
the logical diagram is shown in Figure 3, the researcher sequentially conducted each case
study and compiled individual case study reports. In the next phase, the findings yielded
by the case studies were utilized in answering the research questions, as well as to
determine appropriateness to the case study framework. The relevance of the findings
were used to examine whether the research approach required additional propositions,
before reporting the overall results. In the event, the proposition inferred from data
collection is inadequate (represented by the red dotted line in the diagram), the researcher
must re-evaluate the case study framework and the data collection procedures to identify
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potential shortcomings. Once this process is completed, the researcher can resume the
case study, employing the modified framework and data collection procedures,
summarizing findings pertinent to each case. The researcher then continues to record
preliminary cross-case conclusions and proceeds through the case study sequence using
the original propositions, the original or modified case study framework, and the original
or modified data collection procedures as a guide (represented by the black dotted line).
The data obtained through the case studies allow the researcher to validate the data's
alignment with the existing theories. In the present study, the case study data was
examined in relation to Intrusion Kill Chain Theory (see Table 1), whereby all applicable
implications inferred from the data analysis were carefully recorded. Finally, the
researcher concluded the reports, detailing all study findings, and summarizing the key
findings as relevant to inter-case relationships.
Figure 3. Multiple Case Study Design.

Figure 3. Multiple Case Study Design. From Case study research: Design and
methods (B. Bauhaus Ed., 5th ed.), by R. K. Yin, 2014.
66

of this study. This study presents an array of tools available on the Debian 7 platform,
which is designed to highlight packet content in transit from a node to an endpoint. The
tools available include network vulnerability scans and network forensics tools. This
study was conducted using a desktop computer with a Debian 7 based operating system
to act as a software-based sensor at the pivotal borders of the Smart Home ecosystem
network environment. The first case study was designed to counter attacker-driven
reconnaissance efforts. In addition, its aim was to enhance discovery of any existing
implants on the Smart Home ecosystem network and/or determine the visibility of
common vulnerabilities from internal and external network vantages. The
reconnaissance/discovery phase of the Intrusion Kill Chain illuminates a victim's typical
device-specific vulnerabilities. Because most Smart Home devices are not purposed to
process a broad array of file formats (Abu-Elkheir, Hayajneh, & Ali, 2013;
Working_Party, 2010), the weaponization of any payload is limited to execution of
system-specific tasks, e.g., firmware upgrades or device health status (Babar et al., 2011).
Both reconnaissance/discovery and weaponization evaluation efforts performed as a part
of the first case study helped determine how secure Smart Home systems function
independently from other devices (aligned with RQ1). The specific goal was to
determine confidentiality and authentication susceptibility to cyber intrusions, whereby it
was expected that possible vulnerabilities (or threats) would manifest based on each
device's response. As previously noted, it was also envisaged that, if the devices outlined
in the case study do respond with a positive identification of an exploited vulnerability,
the case study data collection process would be revised to allow for a more
comprehensive analysis of the suspected node and the endpoint communication
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behaviors. The recorded packet capture and sensory data of the first case study were used
during the second case study to help filter benign endpoint TCP/UDP conversations that
have occurred because of automated node communications. The aim of case study two
was to examine the types of behavioral data exchange or aggregate device
communication that occur between Smart Home objects and effect fundamental security
levels (aligned with RQ2). The objective was to determine node-to-node confidentiality,
authentication, and integrity susceptibility to cyber intrusions. During the delivery,
exploitation and installation phases of a cyber intrusion, an attacker must be able to

                      the
receiving device's registry stack (Angelucci, 2014; Babar et al., 2011). A cyber intrusion
mu 

                     

instructions in the remote device's instruction pointer, have the device execute malicious
instructions, and adequately redirect the instruction pointer's anticipated state to an
appropriate registry location (Englander, 2009; Raucher, 2015). Tools that are described
in detail later in this chapter were employed to illuminate the cyber intrusion process.
The procedures required to analyze these processes may expose the possibility of this
vulnerability (or threat), provided that actual device complexity exists to respond to RPC
instructions, per device or collectively. In an event that the devices outlined in the case
study did respond with a positive identification of an exploited vulnerability, the case
study design theory was revised to analyze in greater detail the suspected node(s)'
endpoint communication behaviors. Moreover, an advanced IDS rule was developed to
alert on the observed action. The recorded signature rules, packet capture, or sensory
data from the first and second case studies were used to provide a more advanced
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signature rule set. The final rule set was evaluated to mitigate the occurrence of false
positive or false negative IDS alerts. The effective IDS control state was recorded and
used in the third case study to alert and notify of the existence of applicable payloads.
Case study three was the culmination of the aforementioned efforts, whereby it
incorporated all observations and controls employed in the first and second case study.
Its aim was to identify the emergent security issues related to Smart Home object
behavior (aligned with RQ3). The case study sought to determine how personal safety
relating to cyber security, personal cyber security resilience to cyber-threats, and
personally identifiable information relating to undisclosed information collection is
impacted in a real life context. The command and control and actions on objective
phases of the Intrusion Kill Chain model would typically require the cyber intrusion actor
(or function) to create a reliable path to the node it controls. Subsequently, the cyber
   



   





   

   

controlled nodes to execute instructions at will (with or without sending an
acknowledgment of successful code execution) (Hutchins et al., 2011). The reports
generated upon completion of the prior case studies were evaluated in the third case study
to determine if the observed conditions aided in the discovery of malicious traffic. This
compilation of data included private usage information (or any other privacy
information), detailed information about configurations of devices if such data was
communicated, their firmware versions, or any other information that would give the
attacker useful reconnaissance information.
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Sample
The sample, in the context of the present study, pertains to the devices involved in
the controlled environment. In other words, it pertains to all devices that can be
categorized as Smart Home devices that have the capacity to exhibit behavior beyond the
intended design. As devices in a controlled environment, rather than humans, were the
object of investigation, this definition of sample is not conventional. In addition, in the
controlled environment, controlled refers to the fact that the researcher owns and operates
the itemized equipment as an average consumer. Figure depicts the high-level overview
of the constructed controlled Smart Home ecosystem. In the controlled environment, the
nodes listed in Table 2 were configured as per manufacturer recommendations and were
connected accordingly to the Smart Home ecosystem as depicted. Each node can
communicate with external addresses either through the Internet Service Provider (ISP)
or through the cellular provider's data service. A switch was used to connect additional
nodes that span beyond the connections available on the border router. The network
traffic sensor (represented by the yellow triangle on the right) for the wired connection
uses a hub to expand possible connections between the router and the modem. This hub
connection connects to the computer and the network interface card (NIC) was set to
passive promiscuous mode in order to minimize interference with routed traffic between
the router and the modem. Both the modem and the router were configured as per
manufacturer-recommended settings for both wired (represented by the solid green lines)
and wireless (represented by the solid red line) connections, as applicable. The network
traffic sensor (represented by the yellow triangle on the left) for the wireless connection
uses a USB dongle to create a direct link between the PC and sub-1 GHz frequencies,
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number, and how each appropriate device communicates according to the manufacturer
configuration, along with the category (in terms of the typical arrangement in a Smart
Home ecosystem).
Table 2
IoT Ecosystem Components
Node

Manufacturer

Model

Communications

Category

Home Router
Switch

NETGEAR
Cisco

R6300v2
Catalyst Express 500

Wireless & Wired
Wired

Home Infrastructure
Home Infrastructure

Modem

NETGEAR

CM400

Wired

Home Infrastructure

Z-Wave Range
Extender/Repeater
Power Line Adapter

Aeon Labs Aeotec

DSD37-ZWUS

Z-Wave

Home Infrastructure

NETGEAR

XAV5201

Wireless & Wired

Home Infrastructure

Electronic Deadbolt

Kwikset

910

Z-Wave

Home Security

Wireless Keypad

2GIG Technologies

2GIGPAD1345

Z-Wave

Home Security

Door/Window Contact
Sensor
Wireless Control Panel

2GIG Technologies

2GIG-DW10-345

Z-Wave

Home Security

2GIG Technologies

2GIG-CNTRL1-345

Z-Wave

Home Security

Takeover Module

2GIG Technologies

2GIG-TAKE-345

Z-Wave

Home Security

Passive infrared motion
detector
Smoke/Heat Detector

2GIG Technologies

2GIG-PIR1-345

Z-Wave

Home Security

2GIG Technologies

2GIG-SMKT2-345

Z-Wave

Home Security

Internal GSM Antenna

2GIG Technologies

2GIG-ANT1

Cellular

Home Security

External In-Wall GSM
Antenna
AT&T Go-Control
Vivint
Radio Thermostat

2GIG Technologies

2GIG-ANT1X

Cellular

Home Security

2GIG Technologies

2GIG-GC3GA-V

Cellular

Home Security

2GIG Technologies

2GIG-Z-CT100

Z-Wave

HVAC

LEVITON

DZS15-1LW DZC

Z-Wave

lighting

General Electric

12724

Z-Wave

lighting

Wireless

Multimedia Systems

Z-Wave In-Wall
On/Off Switch
Z-Wave Wireless
Lighting Control
Dimmer Switch
Multimedia system
TV
Satellite Receiver
Gaming System
Computer

ROKU
Sharp

LC-60LE640U

Wireless & Wired

Multimedia Systems

Direct TV

HR44-700

Wireless

Multimedia Systems

PlayStation3

CECH-2501A

Alienware

Wireless

Multimedia Systems

Wireless & Wired

Multimedia Systems

Network Attached
Storage
Smart Phone

Seagate

NAS440

Wired

Multimedia Systems

Samsung

SM-N920V

Wireless & Cellular

Multimedia Systems

Tablet

Samsung

SM-P905V

Multimedia system

Multimedia Systems

ROKU

2710X

Wireless

Multimedia Systems

Hewlett Packard

ZUA5070D57

Multimedia Systems

Sensor Module

Texas Instruments

CC1111EMK

USB, Z-Wave,
Wireless, & Wired
USB & Z-Wave

Sensor Module
Programmer

Travis Goodspeed

GoodFET v42 1279

USB & Z-Wave

Test & Evaluation

Computer
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Test & Evaluation

Instrumentation, Data Collection, and Analysis
The case study instrumentation and data collection plan were designed to
facilitate recording as much detail as possible. This not only assisted with the individual
and cross-case study analysis but also allowed compiling the final results and reaching
study conclusions. The effectiveness of each case study was assessed based on the
recommendations made by the authorities in the field of IoT security, specifically the
NIST SP 800-53 technical safeguards or countermeasures that, if implemented, could
prevent or ameliorate cyber intrusion events (Abrams & Weiss, 2007). Individual case
studies are described in detail in the subsequent sections.
Case Study 1
Case study1 data was collected via Wireshark (an open-source packet capture
software), which allows for the full packet capture of all TCP/UDP connection sessions
through the wired gateway in and out of the Smart Home ecosystem. TCP/UDP traffic
was passively observed through the wired gateway using a throwing Star LAN TAP as a
passive Ethernet tap. Additionally, Z-Wave traffic was captured with the Texas
Instruments CC1111EMK, which allowed the capture of traffic using Z-Force (open
source Z-Wave specific traffic capture software, (Fouladi & Ghanoun, 2013)) in the sub1 GHz frequency range in which Z-Wave traffic operates.
Raw data was analyzed to determine endpoint origins and terminations (see Table
6). The collection of externally viewed conversations assists in the analysis of TCP/UDP
traffic viewable from endpoint to endpoint. In this case study, traffic was analyzed to
determine the location of the associated node communications. Extensive analysis was
also conducted on externally viewed conversations to determine if the traffic can be
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monitored from an external source beyond the router. The collection of internally viewed
conversations assisted in the evaluation of TCP/UDP traffic communicating laterally with
other devices. Analysis of internally viewed conversations allowed identifying nodes or
devices that communicate with other internal devices, as well as elucidating the purpose
of this exchange. Subsequently, conversations that contain any payload, without regard
to purpose or function, were recorded to identify if the observed traffic should be
occurring with any external or internal entities. Table 3 displays a coding matrix that
helps to summarize sample data that emerged from traffic analysis of external
conversations from outside the network, internal to the network, and any associated
conversation payloads from outside or within the network. A coding matrix is significant
to data collection, as it assists with identifying areas where further research of the
observed activity is required.
Table 3
Case Study 1 Data Collection Template
Node
Sample 1

External Conversations
Activity

Internal Conversations
Activity

Payload
Contents
Summary

Case Study 2
The data collected through the first case study was analyzed in the second case
study in order to develop a custom IoT-focused rule set for the open source Debian 7
based operating system network intrusion detection system (NIDS) solution (SNORT)
configured in line with the community rules profile. This analysis helped establish the
extent to which behavioral data exchange or aggregate device communication occurs
between IoT objects that effect fundamental security levels. Table 4 displays a coding
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matrix that summarizes the sample data that emerged from the IDS alerts that were
triggered by external conversations from outside the network directed internally, as well
as internal conversations from inside the network directed externally. The relevant
internal and external conversations were summarized based on general activity, and the
activity was matched to the associated IDS configurations. Similar to case study one, the
payloads of the internal and external conversations were recorded and further researched.
The configuration that triggered the IDS alerts against the associated conversation traffic
was also recorded. Table 4 also helps illuminate node activity associations between the
scope of visibility of all Smart Home traffic and IDS alert configurations in identifying
Smart Home traffic. It is also important to note that traffic observed outbound or inbound
to the controlled environment needs to contain acceptable levels of encryption, as traffic
that meets this criterion is publicly visible.
Table 4
Case Study 2 Data Collection Template
Node
Sample 1

Conversation
Internal or external activity

Payload
Contents Summary

Signature
SNORT configuration

Case Study 3
The aim of case study three was to identify the emergent security issues related to
Smart Home object behavior that affects personal safety relating to cyber security,
resilience to cyber-threats, and personally identifiable information (PII) when
confidential information is resident in the Smart Home ecosystem. Ultimately, data
gathered through case study three facilitated analysis of the IDS configuration to identify
internal or external Smart Home conversations. IDS configuration analysis was
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conducted to identify internal or external Smart Home encrypted traffic. The IDS
configuration analysis also allowed establishing whether the IDS can identify
conversations that contain PII in its PDU payload, as well as nodes responding to
vulnerability scans. Finally, it enabled the researcher to ascertain if the IDS can control
whether Smart Home devices establish point-to-point conversations with internal or
external nodes that are transmitting PII or vulnerability data as a payload (see Table 5).
Table 5
Case Study 3 Data Collection Template
Node
Sample 1

Signature
SNORT
configuration

Payload
Encrypted or
Unencrypted

PII

Vulnerabilities

Yes or No

Yes or No

Controls
SNORT
configuration

Validity and Reliability
The controlled environment is not influenced by researcher's prior knowledge of
any vulnerabilities or threats. Moreover, it can be replicated completely, given that the
replicated environment acquires the nodes and tools discussed in the earlier parts of this
chapter. All sources of data were reported within the constraints of the ethical
considerations outlined in the next section. Unaltered and transparent data collection and
reporting procedures were pivotal to developing accurate cross-case analysis during the
conduct of all three case studies.
Ethical Considerations
Human participation in this research was limited to possible disclosure of
information about the researcher's Smart Home ecosystem that could be repurposed
nefariously. The potential for exposure also existed as vulnerabilities unique to Smart
Home nodes owned by the researcher are discovered. The possible disclosure of other
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personally owned wireless networks that are in proximity to the controlled environment
presented an additional concern that had to be considered. In order to mitigate the risks
of personal information disclosure, appropriate efforts were made to sanitize data
collected containing specific individually identifiable information. Vulnerabilities that
were discovered, identifying specific nodes, were generalized to the function of the node,
as the individual node relates to the overall Smart Home ecosystem. Collateral networks
that are in proximity to the controlled environment were identified as a part of the data
collection process and were not reported in the final analysis.
Summary of Chapter 3
The methodology chosen for the present study was a deliberate attempt to
reconcile an exploratory approach to an emerging technology using case studies.
Multiple methods were explored, which could potentially illuminate privacy concerns in
the Smart Home ecosystem. This study examined multiple intrusion vectors including
wireless technologies and web/IP-based exploits. Yin's (2014) case study construct was
adopted to examine the applicability of exploratory research in the context of Smart
Home ecosystems. Finally, the work reported here relates to the Lockheed Martin
Intrusion Kill Chain to actor-driven intrusions that have possible implications in the
Smart Home ecosystem.
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CHAPTER 4
Results
Introduction
The Smart Home ecosystem described in Chapter 3 was observed using full data
captures (packet captures or PCAPs) from the controlled environment using both a ninja
star wiretap and Z-Wave USB dongle, both of which ultimately served as a data
collection instrument in the three case studies described in Chapter 3. The PCAP data for
the wired network segment was captured using a windows version of Wireshark due to
simplicity and system limitations pertinent to network settings and configurations. The
PCAP from the Z-Wave network was captured on Kali Linux version 2 using the Z-Wave

  

-

  (Fouladi & Ghanoun, 2013) in a virtual machine.

Both

PCAPs were allowed to run while various Z-Wave devices executed tasks within their
scope of capability. Additionally, the PCAP collected notional periods where no activity
should be occurring. Periods of no activity were significant because the devices in the
controlled environment initiated communications with outside sources while no activity
in the Smart Home ecosystem was initiated by human activity. This particular activity
was closely examined to verify that no privacy information existed in the payload.
This chapter is organized with a brief explanation of the sample demographics of
the devices explored in this study followed by the final presentation and discussion of
findings. The final presentation and discussion of findings include case study one, which
involved a survey of Z-Wave and Ethernet compliant communications, case study two,
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which involved the analysis of Z-Wave and Ethernet vulnerabilities observed during the
survey, and case study three, which involved the analysis of the Intrusion Kill Chain and
a cross-examination of the preceding case studies. The chapter is concluded with a
summary of the findings and an introduction to the next chapter.
Sample Demographics
The controlled environment involved devices that were categorized as Smart
Home devices. The Smart Home devices evaluated presented the capacity to exhibit
emergent object behavior. The study examines not humans but devices in a controlled
environment constructed from average consumer Smart Home equipment available on the
market in 2015. In the controlled environment, the nodes listed in Table 2 are configured
with manufacturer recommended configurations and connected accordingly to the Smart
Home ecosystem. Each node was observed communicating with external addresses
either through the ISP or through the cellular provider's data service. Network traffic
sensors were procured for the conduct of this study for packet capture capability for the
single wired connection and for the sub-1GHz frequency Z-Wave connections that occur
between the router, modem, and the Z-Wave control panel. The router and the modem
were configured with manufacturer recommended configurations for both wired and
wireless connections, as applicable. The Z-Wave control panel was configured by a
Vivint technician and configured to their recommended standards.
Presentation and Discussion of Findings
RQ1 sought to determine how secure Smart Home technology IoT systems are
independently. Because the Smart Home ecosystem designed in the present study
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observed object traffic from two methods of communications (Z-Wave and Ethernet),
CS1 is further explored from the Z-Wave and Ethernet perspectives.
Z-Wave Compliant Communications (Case Study 1). At a basic level, the ZWave network architecture consists of a controller node and a slave node. The controller
node acts as the central hub that establishes the unique network identifier, the Home ID,
which is repeated in the preamble of a slave node. In the present study, the controller
node for the Z-Wave network within the controlled Smart Home ecosystem is the
wireless control panel, as described in Table 2. During case study one (henceforth CS1),
the controller node was observed initiating transmission to other slave nodes on the
network. As explained by McClure et al., (2015), communications from the wireless
control panel are typically polling or updating slave nodes for health and maintenance of
network routing topologies. Responding to the controller node, as indicated by the Node
ID observed during the packet capture, were the slave nodes, also described in Table 2.
The slave nodes responded to the solicitations from the control node directly or indirectly
from the subsequent re-solicitation from adjacent slave nodes. Similar to IEEE 802.15.4
compliant communications, the Z-Wave nodes observed during CS1 used a meshnetworking model to compensate for a node-to-controller range communication failure,
using positive acknowledgment and frame retransmission. It was noted during CS1 that
the Z-Wave communication network was self-forming and capable of routing dynamic
network topology updates (McClure, Scambray, & Kurtz, 2015). Further research into
the Z-Wave structured protocol stack configuration helped elucidate how components
relative to each node performed node-to-node and node-to-controller communications.
The Z-Wave structured protocol stack is comprised of five layers, namely the physical,
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media access control (MAC), transport, network, and the application layer (Fouladi &
Ghanoun, 2013; McClure et al., 2015). The physical layer performed physical
connectivity tasks associated with channel assignment within the sub-1 GHz radio
frequency (RF) modulation and synchronization. The MAC layer of the structured
protocol stack displayed the unencrypted Z-Wave Home ID and Node ID. This layer was
also capable of preventing collisions using device-specific unique Node ID's and collision
avoidance algorithms. The transport layer of the structured protocol stack performed the
tasks specific to transmission and reception acknowledgment of frames, as observed
during CS1 in the checksum values in the captured frames. The network layer displayed
the mesh topology updates and carried out inter-node frame routing, as appropriate, to the
device location. The network layer is also responsible for defining and allocating
hierarchical device roles in the structured protocol stack, e.g., determining which device
is designated as a controller or a slave. The network layer definition and allocation
process also associated the device Home ID and Node ID for network route
establishment. The network layer definition and allocation functionality are particular
security concern given the concept of the Z-Wave node inclusion and exclusion process
(McClure et al., 2015). As Z-Wave devices are added to the network, physical access is
required to the Z-Wave controller node to initiate the Z-Wave network
inclusion/exclusion process. The requirement for physical proximity for an authorized
user is essential to maintaining a multifactor security defensive posture for the Z-Wave
network. Thus, cyber intruders would have to circumvent physical safeguards in order to
include or exclude devices from the network. The last hierarchal tier of the structured
protocol stack is the application layer. The application layer brokers the payloads of the
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frames received and transmitted. More specifically, the application layer parses and
processes payload data, e.g., requests for topology updates and responses to inclusion
requests. As a part of CS1, the application layer payload data was closely observed to
determine if unencrypted payload contents were routed outside the Z-Wave network via
the Ethernet compliant communications. McClure et al., (2015) made specific note that
Z-Wave operates at a 3 75-foot range, contingent on the content and type of information
required to be transmitted as well as the power source. During the conduct of CS1, the
effective distance was not confirmed due to a lack of specialized tools needed to
accomplish sub-1 GHz ranging. Nonetheless, it was confirmed that both the control and
the slave nodes consistently listen for network topology updates to enhance the meshed
infrastructure and further extend the network range, up to four hops (McClure et al.,
2015). Range capability of the Z-Wave network is significant to this study, as security
implications of specific node-to-node communication may expose pertinent device
configuration details that may be of value to an attacker even if located at a considerable
distance. It was also observed during CS1 that battery-powered Z-Wave devices were
not participants in topology updates to other nodes. As suggested by McClure et al.,
(2015), battery-powered Z-Wave devices did not participate in forwarding topology
changes as a battery conservation strategy (McClure et al., 2015). During the conduct of
CS1, the repeater node described in Table 2 was unplugged from the wall and the
controller node was observed broadcasting topology updates to the remaining participant
nodes. Subsequently, once the repeater node was plugged back into the power source
within the timeframe necessary to ensure that the node would not be disassociated from
the network, the proper Home ID was broadcasted from the repeater node and the
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controller node broadcasted additional topology updates to the remaining participant
nodes. As explained by McClure et al., (2015), a Z-Wave node was added to the network
through the inclusion process explained above in the application layer portion of the ZWave structured protocol stack. The mechanics related to this process include the
primary controller associating a Node ID to the device in the range between 1 and 232.
Subsequently, Z-Wave nodes continued to use the Node ID value in all transmissions
while still assigned within the Z-Wave network. Thus, the Z-Wave network was limited
to a maximum of 232 nodes (McClure et al., 2015).
In CS1, the Z-Wave communications, observed using Z-Force, did display the
Home ID and Node ID in plain text in the PCAP, as explained above, followed by
encrypted payload data. In the context of CS1, externally viewed conversations refer to
the computer that was not associated with the Z-Wave Home ID and was able to capture,
passively, the traffic from the Z-Wave network. The internal communications were
observed in the same manner, focusing on node-to-node specific communications and the
content of the conversations. Once any content was discovered from both the external
view and the internal view, the traffic behavioral heuristics were generalized to explore
the purpose of the conversation, and the results were recorded. Table 6 provides
generalized conversations that occurred during the packet capture. The packet capture
was terminated after 48 hours. This limitation was imposed to ensure that adequate data
would be captured to observe all sequences of communications possible from the
participating devices, while also making the data set manageable from the analytical
perspective. From the Z-Wave PCAP, the activity of the entire content of the Z-Wave
communications could be observed promiscuously, as shown in Table 6.
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Table 6
Case Study 1 Data Collection
Node
Z-Wave Slave Node
Z-Wave Slave Node
Z-Wave Control
Node
Z-Wave Control
Node
Z-Wave Control
Node

Externally Viewed
Conversations
Promiscuous Z-Wave
sniffing
Promiscuous Z-Wave
sniffing
Promiscuous Z-Wave
sniffing
Promiscuous Z-Wave
sniffing

Internal Viewed
Conversations
Home ID and Node ID
(Encrypted Payload)
Home ID and Node ID
(Encrypted Payload)

Payload
Network topology updates

Home ID

Network topology updates

Home ID

Response solicitation

UDP OpenVPN

Encrypted (TLS RSA)

IP Fragmented and
Encrypted

Response to control node

Ethernet Compliant Communications (Case Study 1). While the Z-Wave
traffic was captured during the execution of CS1, Wireshark was used to capture all
Ethernet compliant communications entering and exiting the controlled environment, as
explained above. None of the Z-Wave formatted traffic was visible from the wired
packet capture; however, traffic originating from the Z-Wave wireless control panel was
observed communicating with a Vivint server using an OpenVPN protocol during
associated timestamps at which the Z-Wave network traffic was observed. The Vivint
server was identified by resolving the IP address captured during the Wireshark analysis
  



     

        

correlation between the captured Ethernet communications and the observed Z-Wave
activity was confirmed through the Internet Protocol (IP) fragmentation that occurred
with correlated timestamps between the two network captures. The OpenVPN protocol
did encrypt the conversations originating internally to the Z-Wave network. Thus, the
theoretical concepts that support how the OpenVPN protocol achieves secure endpointto-endpoint conversations is detailed when discussing kernel agnostic tunneling
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architectures, UDP/TCP modes, encryption, public/private keys, and payloads later in this
chapter. The kernel agnostic tunneling architectures (e.g., TAPs and TUNs) refer to
network devices supported entirely in software. OpenVPN is a Secure Socket Layer
(SSL)-based Virtual Private Network (VPN) protocol that makes use of the modern
Transport Layer Security (TLS) as a method to secure endpoint connections (Crist &
Keijser, 2015). The operating system needed to run OpenVPN is agnostic because
OpenVPN does not rely on operating system-specific kernel architecture due to the TAP
and TUN devices organic to OpenVPN. The TAP and TUN (explained below) devices
foster the support for a variety of operating systems, including Linux,
Free/Open/NetBSD, Solaris, AIX, Windows, Mac OS, and iOS/Android devices (Crist &
Keijser, 2015). However, all aforementioned operating systems still require the
installation of client software, which in the case of CS1 was the Z-Wave wireless control
panel and the Vivint application installed on the Android device initiating the commands
to the Z-Wave network. As a part of CS1, it was also observed that OpenVPN operates
using a control channel and a data channel, both of which are encrypted using a custom
encryption protocol (easy RSA as observed in CS1, see Table 6). Moreover, all traffic
was passed over a single UDP connection using the default OpenVPN protocol and UDP
port 1194. The TUN, as referenced above, is an abbreviation for TUNnel. For
OpenVPN to function, TUNs create a virtual network layer, with the capability to
encapsulate and route layer-3 IP packets (Crist & Keijser, 2015). TAPs, as referenced
above, is an abbreviation for a network tap. TAPs perform the task of virtualizing data
link layer encapsulation (layer 2) for Ethernet frames, creating network bridges,
facilitating collision avoidance and hardware address association (Crist & Keijser, 2015).
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OpenVPN uses TAPs and TUNs to process the incoming and outgoing traffic as an
application running on the OpenVPN client device. While conducting CS1, it was noted
that the encryption protocol OpenVPN was implementing TLS over UDP, as noted in
Table 6. TLS is a symmetric encryption technique that employs a uniquely generated key
for each session that is negotiated through the control channel during the initiation of the
session. TLS also has the organic capability to support identity authentication using
public-key cryptography. The public and private key exchange process that occurred
during the conduct of CS1 and during the IP fragmented sessions from the OpenVPN
protocol took place when the TLS control channel VPN connection was being initiated.
Key exchange was also observed during the exchange of new encryption keying material
that, according to Crist and Keijser (2015), occurs after a predetermined time lapse. The
data channel public and private key exchange process are not negotiated; rather, they are
stored in the client and server OpenVPN configuration files (Crist & Keijser, 2015).
Finally, the OpenVPN data payloads employ hashing algorithms, such as SHA1, to help
ensure the integrity of the packets delivered.
The appropriateness of RQ1 in relation to the first case study and the case study
framework establishes that Smart Home ecosystem devices are moderately secure
independent of other devices on the network. This assertion is made due to the fact that
privacy information is visible using open source tools from a 75 feet standoff distance.
Subsequently, the requirement for physical proximity to the Z-Wave controller nodes
does help mitigate threat possibilities. The information gathered during CS1 is further
evaluated in case study two.
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Z-Wave Communications Vulnerabilities (Case Study 2). RQ2 sought to
determine what behavioral data exchange or aggregate device communication occurs
between Smart Home objects that effect fundamental security levels. Because the Smart
Home ecosystem designed in the present study observed object traffic from two methods
of communications (Z-Wave and Ethernet), case study two is further explored from the
Z-Wave and Ethernet vulnerabilities perspectives. Thus, further research was conducted
to explore the vulnerabilities observed during the execution of CS1. As demonstrated in
CS1, Z-Force can obtain frame-level visibility of the unencrypted Z-Wave data link, and
network layers. An attacker could execute a spoofing attack of an observed Node ID.
This would allow the attacker to interact with other nodes over a Z-Wave network
without alarming any physical safeguards organic to the Z-Wave network (Fouladi &
Ghanoun, 2013). The Z-Wave proprietary protocol does offer an optional security layer,
which is implemented at the application layer in the later generations of Z-Wave devices
(McClure et al., 2015). However, further security enhancements are subject to cost
constraints, and the Z-Wave Alliance has not produced public documentation disclosing
security mechanisms employed by Z-Wave devices (McClure et al., 2015). The
theoretical concepts that support how Z-Wave traffic employed encryption observed in
CS1 revealed that the Z-Wave encryption methods make use of an AES-OFB (Advanced
Encryption Standard - Output Feedback Mode) protocol (McClure et al., 2015). The
findings reported by Fouladi and Ghanoun (2013) confirm that the protocol
implementation of the encryption and authentication methods as used by the Z-Wave
AES-OFB is a vulnerability that could allow an attacker to reset the established network
key on a target Z-Wave device. This vulnerability arises mainly due to the lack of state
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validation in the key exchange protocol handler programmed in the Z-Wave physical
device (Fouladi & Ghanoun, 2013).
Because the encryption and authentication methods are vulnerable on the Z-Wave
network and the critical node membership information can be observed in plain text
(Home ID and Node ID), a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack is possible for the Z-Wave
network. The Z-Wave member devices do not validate the identity of the controller,
making it possible for valid commands from the controller to be intercepted during the
inclusion process with a target device. This vulnerability causes the unassociated ZWave device to associate to a malicious Z-Wave controller (McClure et al., 2015).
The encryption and authentication methods also expose the Z-Wave network to
attacks due to the lack of confidentiality protection during the Key recovery delivery over
the Z-Wave network. The Key recovery key is a well-known character string that was
passively observed during the inclusion process in the conduct of case study two
(henceforth CS2) while using Z-Force. This key could subsequently be used to decrypt
and forge anomalous packets to the Z-Wave network (McClure et al., 2015).
In CS2, the data collected from CS1 was analyzed to develop a custom Smart
Home focused rule set from the open source Debian 7 based operating system network
intrusion detection system (NIDS) solution (SNORT). SNORT was first configured to
alert on all traffic that matched community-rules profiles. The purpose of proposing this
tool was to explore the applicability of using SNORT to evaluate Z-Wave packet data.
During the execution of CS2, SNORT was unable to parse the PCAP collected during
CS1. Thus, the development of a tool was proposed for multi-layer traffic behavioral
data exchange and aggregate device communication occurring within a Smart Home
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the Z-Wave structured protocol stack and would pass Z-Wave activity along to the
metadata function. The Z-Wave output would have the capability to send properly
configured control and data channel commands to the Z-Wave network. Overall, the ZWave IO would serve the purpose of collecting and locally responding to anomalous
events observed of the Z-Wave network. The Ethernet TAP input would have the
functionality of collecting Z-Wave conversations that traverse the Ethernet compliant
communications to the ISP (see Ethernet traffic sensor shown in Figure 5). Both wired
and wireless inputs would need the functionality of a protocol analyzer containing the
low-level protocol configurations and would have the capacity to configure the protocol
mappings dynamically from the rule sets maintained by a Security as a Service (SECaaS)
service provider. The locally configured protocol mappings would contain a list of all
known protocol states that is readily accessible from RAM. The metadata function,
depicted in blue, would be capable of deep packet inspection (DPI), as well as of
decrypting OpenVPN TLS and Z-Wave payload traffic. Here, the stateless logic,
depicted in light gray, would be capable of verifying user activity against baseline
signatures/heuristics (also called whitelisting). Subsequently, the stateless logic, also
depicted in light gray, would be capable of receiving rule set definitions from the
dynamic rule set. The dynamic rule set, also depicted in blue, would be a cloud-based
solution (SECaaS) that is locally maintained for quick and fail-resistant communications
with metadata functions. Lightweight cryptography standards, depicted as encryption,
are employed in this solution for ensuring that all Z-Wave IO and Ethernet compliant
communications remain resilient to external attacks and intrusions. Lastly, the swap file
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is monitored via API locally for user level alerts and via SECaaS for an expeditious
analytical response.
The proposed solution will help establish the extent to which behavioral data
exchange or aggregate device communication occurs between the IoT objects that effect
fundamental security levels. Table 7 summarizes the coding matrix that would notionally
be collected from the proposed solution as IDS alerts trigger on external conversations
from outside the network directed internally, as well as internal conversations from inside
the network directed externally (bidirectional). The relevant conversations were
  

         

  

 

 

 

configuration. Once the Z-Wave Wireless Control Panel initiated conversations, the
packet content was analyzed to determine if the Z-Wave network modification request
matched the heuristics defined in the dynamic rule set. If the alerts were triggered due to
an anomalous device requesting membership to the Z-Wave network, the standard output
would notify the user for immediate actions. If the user failed to respond, the SECaaS
service provider would have the culpability to address the issue and directly communicate
with the Z-Wave network. Table 7 helps illuminate node activity associations between
Z-Wave traffic and IDS alert configurations. It is also important to note that traffic
observed outbound or inbound in the Smart Home ecosystem is encrypted to meet
lightweight cryptography standards for publicly visible traffic.
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As observed in CS2, and depicted in Figure 7, if an application or protocol is
using UDP for configuration and cipher material negotiation, it is susceptible to message
deletion or packet reordering attacks (Crist & Keijser, 2015). The exception to this
vulnerability is the pre-shared key point-to-point method using a custom easy RSA key,
as explained above. In the case of the OpenVPN conversations that were observed
during CS2, only the data channel used this technique. To avoid possible MitM attacks
where server impersonation causes client(s) to attempt to connect an adjacent client(s),
server certificate verification must be instituted by clients (OpenVPN_Technologies,
2013).
As depicted in Table 7
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trigger due to an

anomalous device intercepting the Ethernet compliant communications tampering with
the IP fragmentation from the ISP network. Subsequently, the standard output would
notify the user for immediate actions. If the user failed to respond, the SECaaS service
provider would have the capability to address the issue and directly communicate with
the Z-Wave network.
The appropriateness of RQ2 in relation to CS2 and the case study framework
establishes that Smart Home ecosystem devices are not secure when behavioral data
exchange or aggregate device communication occurs between Smart Home objects that
effect fundamental security levels. This assertion is made due to the fact the Z-Wave
AES-OFB perpetuates a vulnerability that could allow an attacker to reset the negotiated
key between a target Z-Wave device and a Z-Wave controller. Furthermore, the
requirement for an RSA key, during the OpenVPN conversations is exclusive to the data
channel conversations on the Ethernet communications in the Smart Home ecosystem.
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The lack of a control channel RSA key subjects Ethernet compliant communications to
possible MitM attacks and does not help mitigate threat possibilities. The theoretical
concepts supporting how CS2 was executed for both Z-Wave and Ethernet traffic
observations prompted the need for the proposed solution, as it helps establish the extent
to which behavioral data exchange or aggregate device communication occurs between
the IoT objects that influence fundamental security levels. The information gathered
during CS2 is further evaluated in case study three.
Kill Chain Analysis (Case Study 3). RQ3 sought to explore the emergent
security issues related to Smart Home object behavior that affects personal safety relating
to cyber security, resilience to cyber threats, and personally identifiable information from
the collection of object usage data. CS1 demonstrated that a cyber intrusion was possible
in the Intrusion Kill Chain categories of reconnaissance and weaponization, as shown in
Table 1. In previous studies related to Z-Wave security, the researchers demonstrated the
effectiveness of using the Z-Force tool to perform actor-driven efforts to discover
generalized information about a potential victim (Fouladi & Ghanoun, 2013). The
methods proposed by Fouladi and Ghanoun (2013) were replicated during the conduct of
this study. The Z-Force tool and the ninja star Ethernet TAP represent reconnaissance
phase activities require     

        -Wave

network. Conclusions are drawn to assist in determining whether the victim's technology
in use is susceptible to specific attack vectors. The weaponization phase occurs when the
attacker customizes attack vectors, e.g., executes a spoofing attack of an observed Node
ID. This would help the attacker's computer to interact with other nodes over a Z-Wave
network without alarming any physical safeguards organic to the Z-Wave network.
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Because Z-Wave traffic could be observed without the physical access inside the Smart
Home ecosystem, attackers could be up to 75 feet away from the home to observe ZWave architecture without range-extending wireless tools. This would allow the attacker
both standoff distance and the necessary time to construct tools unique to the Z-Wave
architecture. The attacker could weaponize packet data that would be capable of
executing MitM attacks or key recovery attacks, as described above. Delivery would
occur when the infrastructure is physically connecting the attacker (or attacker's
architecture) to the victim (or victim's architecture) transmits the weaponized function.
The proposed solution outlined above would aid in detecting multi-layer traffic
behavioral data exchange and aggregate device communication during the delivery and
exploitation, thus illuminating successful manipulation of a particular vulnerability using
the weaponized function. Subsequently, the proposed solution will alert, via standard out
or via SECaaS, of any weaponized function installs or subsequent calls to implant
instructions on the victim's network. The aim of conducting case study three (henceforth
CS3), was to identify the emergent security issues related to Smart Home object behavior
that adversely affects personal safety relating to cyber security, resilience to cyber threats,
and personally identifiable information (PII) when confidential information is resident in
the Smart Home ecosystem. During the conduct of CS3, analysis of the IDS
configuration based on the solution proposed in CS2 was used to identify internal or
external Smart Home conversations. The proposed IDS configuration identified internal
and external Smart Home encrypted traffic in the packet payload, as noted in Table 8.
The IDS configuration analysis identified conversations that contain PII, along with
nodes responding to vulnerability scans. The two main areas of focus for the proposed
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solution pertained to the wireless control panel and the Z-Wave member devices, as they
communicated externally via the ISP, as shown in Figure 7 and Table 8. Control over the
Smart Home devices that establish point-to-point conversations with internal or external
nodes that are transmitting PII or vulnerability data as a payload is mitigated by the
proposed solution's user and SECaaS alerts. User and SECaaS provider's response to
alerts also mitigates risks associated with the attacker infrastructure establishment during
the command and control phase and the final phase activities.
Table 8
Case Study 3 Data Collection
Node
Wireless
Control
Panel
Any ZWave
device

Signature
Trigger on
Unassociated
Device
requesting ZWave
membership
Trigger on
unencrypted
traffic

Payload

PII

Vulnerabilities

Controls

Unencrypted

Yes

Yes

User
verification
of activity

Encrypted

yes

yes

User
verification
of activity

The appropriateness of RQ3 in relation to CS3 and the case study framework
establishes that Smart Home ecosystem presents emergent security issues related to
Smart Home object behavior that concerns personal safety relating to cyber security,
resilience to cyber threats, and personally identifiable information. This assertion is made
due to personally identifiable information traversing internal and external to the Smart
home ecosystem in plain text. The use of the proposed solution does help mitigate
associated threats identified in RQ3.
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Summary of Findings
When interpreting the findings yielded by the present study, it is essential to
acknowledge their lack of generalizability to every Smart Home ecosystem configuration,
Smart Home device, or ISP communications with the Smart Home ecosystem. The
research conducted in this study presented the analysis of CS1, CS2, and CS3. CS1
presented the analysis of Z-Wave and Ethernet compliant communications. The analysis
of CS1 involved the passive capture of Z-Wave and Ethernet compliant communications
and the presentation and further research of the observations. CS2 presented the analysis
of Z-Wave and Ethernet vulnerabilities using SNORT. The Z-Wave and Ethernet
vulnerabilities were not fully explored due to a capability gap, which identified that
accurate correlation between the captured Ethernet communications and the observed ZWave activity is not currently possible without the proposed solution. In addition, it
should be emphasized that the proposed tool designed for deep packet inspection capable
of decrypting OpenVPN TLS and Z-Wave payload traffic would follow the logic
described above and would be capable of verifying user activity against white-listed
baseline signatures/heuristics. CS3 presented the analysis of the Intrusion Kill Chain and
a cross-examination of the preceding case studies. CS3 also investigated the practical use
of the proposed solution as an effort to mitigate the transmission of PII or vulnerability
specific data in/outbound to the Smart Home ecosystem. Chapter 5 presents conclusions
drawn from the data presented in chapter 4. The present study offers viable solutions and
recommendations for enhanced security practices in the use of Smart Home technology.
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CHAPTER 5
Findings and Conclusion
Smart Home ecosystems are seen as the next step in the computing age evolution.
Owing to their reliance on platforms that integrate and aggregate ubiquitous sensors and
devices with a variety of communication protocols, Smart Home ecosystems are
empowered by cloud technology and make the devices consumers use on a daily basis
more intelligent and thus more beneficial. In the Smart Home, the resident is safer due to
on-demand communications to local emergency responders, the mobility-impaired
individuals are more independent, and countless others are expected to benefit from the
almost limitless possibilities that will likely emerge as the technology becomes more
widespread. However, as modern society progresses technologically, so do the ability of
those who wish to perpetuate harm, to steal, or to exploit the innocent. The aim of the
present study was to explore the current vulnerabilities in the emerging Smart Home
ecosystem and identify patterns cyber attackers would exploit to inflict nefarious actions.
The case studies presented in this thesis were designed and conducted in order to evaluate
the Smart Home ecosystem by applying two prominent methods of inter- and intracommunication technologies

Ethernet compliant communications and Z-Wave

compliant communications.
The problem this study sought to address is the gap in knowledge consumers have
concerning vulnerabilities within IoT devices given recent trends of accelerated and the
regular purchase of smart technology. This study offered a qualitative exploratory
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research with the purpose of investigating Smart Home technology vulnerabilities within
a real life context of the IoT typical usage applications. Moreover, this study was
purposed to characterize average Smart Home device usage in contrast to acceptable and
nefarious data heuristic behaviors. Subsequently, SNORT and the proposed solution
contrasted data behavior and illuminated anomalous datalink traffic and payloads.
Finally, real-time Smart Home traffic was evaluated for the propensity to be vulnerable
and disclose personally identifiable information (PII) through exploring current and
proposed solutions in a controlled Smart Home ecosystem environment. The information
obtained during the course of this study involved the systematic acquisition and analysis
of Smart Home ecosystem link-layer PDUs. The methodology employed during this
study involved a recursive multiple case study evaluation of the Smart Home ecosystem
data-link layer PDUs and aligned the case studies to the existing Intrusion Kill Chain
design model. The proposed solution emerging from the case studies builds the
appropriate data collection template while concurrently developing a SECaaS capability
to evaluate collected results. The ethical implications during the conduct of this study
involved limited human participation. The only exception was the possible disclosure of
information about the researcher's Smart Home ecosystem that could be repurposed
nefariously. To mitigate the possibilities of personal information disclosure, appropriate
efforts were made to mask the data collected containing specific ISP information. The
vulnerabilities discovered were generalized to the function of the specific node as the
individual node relates to the overall Smart Home ecosystem. Collateral networks were
discovered in proximity to the controlled environment. However, the collateral networks
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were not reported in the final analysis of the data, as the collateral networks did not
impede any instruments used in the conduct of this study.
Chapter 5 presents the conclusions from the as appropriate to the conduct of all
three case studies. The findings and conclusions present solutions to mitigate Smart
Home technology vulnerabilities discovered during the conduct of this study, the
limitations of the study, the implications for practice, the implications inferred from the
conduct of this study, and the recommendations for future research. Finally, this chapter
is surmised with the overall generalizations found during the conduct of this study.
The sensors used to control smart technology gather data. It is thus advised that
users seek the necessary information regarding the types of data the devices used in the
context of a Smart Home ecosystem generates (Widman, 2015). Because of increased
risks of unauthorized access, users need to consider sensor orientation when sensors are
utilized in the home. According to Widman (2015), it was possible to monitor homes
remotely through video cameras already installed in the home. In fact, in this study, the
author assessed ten security systems, reporting that all tested systems were affected by
this particular issue. Not only was it possible to watch the home, but also obtain
information as to whether or not the home was vacant. Therefore, users need to amplify
the security features of the devices. In fact, the insecure defaults of the systems are
considered one of the major problems related to these devices. As a result, default
passwords need to be changed and the new ones made sufficiently strong by using lower
and upper case letters, numbers, and symbols to increase security. Keeping networks
separate is an adequate resolution to protect personal data on phones and PCs. In
addition, each network should have a separate password to protect the connected home
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devices from hackers in the event of an intrusion (Widman, 2015). Furthermore, network
segmentation is necessary. Another useful option is to hide the network or make it
invisible to allow the associated Wi-Fi network to be discovered by automatic searching.
As a result of this configuration, in order to use this network, users would be required to
know the name, enhancing security. As mentioned above, other threats originate outside
the proximity of the home, typically from open ports in the IP construct (Kong, Tian,
Pan, Liu, & Wu, 2013). Remote communication channels are established between
remote maintenance servers and the devices in the home, allowing the consumer, the
Smart Home service provider, and the Smart Home manufacturers, but also potential
attackers, to communicate with the specific devices. The most obvious solution to this
issue is to turn off the communication channels. Unfortunately, it is presently possible to
manipulate communication channels to an attacker's desired state. Additionally, users are
typically limited to reduced functionalities when devices are powered off. There are
other solutions to this problem, such as re-sequencing of the more common ports
(obfuscation) to other ports and/or creating a pseudo port-based encryption at the point of
entry for the device/home (Agrawal & Sohi, 2012). In simple terms, re-sequencing will
deny a straight-line communication channel to a  devices/home. Finally, as
with all devices that communicate across networks, a so-called zero-day threat is always
present (Bambauer, 2013). These are unforeseen threats, for which no solution can be
provided in advance. While this deficiency is inevitable, whenever issues emerge, there
are learning opportunities that help advance the given field. Thus, networks are still
thriving and are overcoming threats and vulnerabilities by quickly identifying emergent
issues and researching the solution.
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Limitations of the Study
The study conducted cannot be generalized to all that own technology because it
did not include all types of technology. As executed, this study is generalized only to
those that own smart technology that is similar to the devices evaluated. The study also
accounts for the generalization of the knowledge level of those that own smart
technology by fully explaining the specific tools required to address the full potential and
implications existent given multiple proprietary vulnerabilities. The generalization of the
knowledge level is done to acknowledge the existence of tools that can circumvent
encryption levels that are   

            

conduct this study. Thus, the vulnerabilities discovered, the systems used, and the tools
incorporated in this study are limited to a moderately capable desktop computer running
Windows 10 and the tools required to observe traffic on the networks falling within the
scope of this study.
Implications for Practice
The NIST standards and guidelines offer potential approaches to mitigating
security and privacy concerns in the IoT (Hogan & Newton, 2015). NIST validates the
requirements for the solution proposed in this study by offering the challenge of
developing lightweight cryptography standards that meet the demands of the IoT
hardware constraints (Hogan & Newton, 2015). NIST guidelines emphasize the
importance of security and privacy in the IoT and differentiate their unique requirements
from traditional hardware and software designs for desktop/server environments. It is
also postulated that advanced cryptography would be the most effective means of
enhancing the security posture of Smart Home ecosystems. Given a sufficiently strong
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encryption sequence, interconnected device communication, and susceptible systems,
internal Smart Home device Z-Wave and Ethernet traffic would become exponentially
more resilient to external attacks and intrusions.
Jajodia,

   

2005) recommended that security installers disable

port forwarding to reduce alarm system susceptibility

      .

Concurring with this view, some authors argue that port forwarding is not needed because
it exposes vulnerabilities unnecessarily. Jajodia et al. (2005) also recommended
installing a virtual private network (VPN), which provides users with secure, encrypted
tunnels (Jajodia et al., 2005). These tunnels allow the user to visit the desired site safely
and securely. Many experts also recommend that the home PC have a separate network
than the connected devices in the Smart Home. It is expected that home security and
automation systems will experience more vulnerabilities due to the migration from IPv4
to IPv6. The purpose of these protocols is to carry communications in the form of
Internet traffic from endpoint to endpoint. With the emergence of IPv6, ubiquitous
devices can be interconnected conveniently from endpoint to endpoint, increasing Smart
Home mainstream applicability. Given IPv6's greater address space, ubiquitous devices
can possess unique IPv6 address and subsequently configure themselves automatically
when connected to an IPv6 network using dynamic address auto-configuration protocols
(Liu, Yang, Chen, & Pan, 2014). Therefore, those planning the use of Smart Home
technology need to be aware of hacking concerns as well. Although each Smart Home
technology uses similar concepts, each of these systems has the same type of architecture,
resulting in similar vulnerabilities. According to one hacker (King, 2015), the firmware
is considered the brains of a device. Firmware is instrumental in remotely pointing the
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device to an update provided by a hacker. Cyber intrusions that are extensive enough to
manipulate device firmware allow the hacker to compromise the device without the
victim being aware of such an intrusion, causing the device to be useless to the victim;
such approaches are often referred to as a rootkit. Some Smart Home manufacturers
insist that vulnerabilities be part of the design. These same manufacturers argue that
consumers wanted the vulnerabilities to remain to run custom scripts and plug-ins. Other
IoT vendors have products with built-in security bugs that are similar. Therefore, these
exposures can be combated by simply requiring that manufacturers install security
compliant firmware, while also mandating verification of application codes. These
security considerations are important in light of the fact that there are 25 vulnerabilities in
a common device, causing approximately 75% of those presently in use to be vulnerable
to hacking at any given moment (King, 2015).
It is debatable whether or not the market is prepared to defend devices using the
necessary resources or should apply similar (or the same) safeguards and standards used
with computers (Bartik, 2015). These issues pertain to all types of smart technology and
are not unique to Smart Homes. However, the connected house is expected to become
the norm, as technology continues to advance to provide smarter capabilities. The
mainstream is embracing Smart Home technology. For instance, according to one
survey, by 2019, over two-thirds of consumers will purchase smart devices. Although no
standard security recommendations presently exist as the Smart Home technology is new,
protection can be attained by utilizing solutions for security issues. For example, security
can be improved using password manager software and mobile data security. Once these
solutions are leveraged, greater involvement in the groundwork security is expected,
105

benefitting the future users by protecting their privacy. The obvious strategy is to
password-protect devices, as this assists in preventing tracking (Hill, 2012). Another
effective option is to encrypt devices. Encryption is essential because it has been argued
that Smart Home technology mirrors the capabilities of a tiny computer (Widman, 2015).
Moreover, according to Hewlett-Packard, many of the currently available home security
systems are particularly vulnerable to eavesdropping on communications.
Implications of Study and Recommendations for Future Research
Many of the vulnerabilities confirmed in this study have been discovered in
previous practitioner demonstrations. However, little information exists exploring the
consolidated risks that emerge when proprietary system interact with one another with
little to no security standards for communications. Currently, there are no off the shelf
devices that offer the level of analytics needed to combat active cyberspace security
events. Furthermore, the resource constrained consumer technologies or the Smart home
ecosystem, lacks both the infrastructure and architecture to prevent active cyberspace
security events. This study explored and proposed the development of a system that has
the capability to learn Smart home ecosystem baseline configurations. The hardware
based solution outlined and recommended in this study requires future attention as it
would present an appropriate level of visibility to detect and alert Smart Home users of
the occurrence of rogue nodes and anomalous devices. Ideally, a hybrid of a
hardware/software/cloud-based solution would offer behavioral heuristics analysis, using
checksums similar to the TCP protocol, that is continuously monitored by a SECaaS
provider. The system solution outlined and proposed in this study should be aligned at
the gateways of the Smart Home Ecosystem to alert and identify success and failure of
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node member authentication to the Z-Wave network. Future research should include
methods that can be employed to adequate encryption home ID visibility, whereas traffic
transmitted in the sub-1GHz frequency range is not readily observed using conventional
tools e.g. protocol analyzers Wireshark and Z-Force. Future research should include the
testing of encryption strength of traffic that goes to the ethernet compliant networks from
the Z-Wave wireless gateway. Future research should include a quantitative assessment
of the systems mentioned in this study of how many consumers understand security
implications contained within this study. This would determine if the systems in use from
various Smart Home providers have inherent vulnerabilities or flaws that expose
consumers to unacceptable levels where PII concerns are not mitigated, and
vulnerabilities are not mitigated.
Conclusion
IoT expands the reach of technology and provides the means for the physical
world to derive its characteristics from the cyberspace domain. Smart Home technology
is merely a subset of the IoT, as it is currently limited to the items that make life at home
more intelligent. The IoT and IoE make the world more communal and our interactions
with it more intelligent, while also rendering the tasks we are required to perform on a
daily basis more receptive to human behavioral heuristics. The ever-growing security
concerns are not a phenomenon that can be ignored in the home. Solutions to the security
implication in the home require innovative thinking, more collaborative development,
and combative complacency that postures future generations in an Internet where
everything personal and vulnerable is preserved from cyber incursions.
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